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I. INTRODUCTION
Many of the Bering Sea/Aleutian Islands (BSAI) crab fisheries
are in serious decline or have collapsed. In order to prevent a tragedy
of the commons,1 the North Pacific Fishery Management Council
("NPFMC" or the "Council"), 2 which is responsible for fishery man-
agement in the Gulf of Alaska under the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery
Conservation and Management Act3 (the "Magnuson Act" or the
"Act"), has recently adopted a preferred alternative4 for rationalization
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1. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968), reprinted in ROGER
W. FINDLEY & DANIEL A. FARBER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 42
(5th ed. 1999). Hardin described the "tragedy of the commons" as a pasture open to all, where
each herdsman is free to graze his cattle. This arrangement will work as long as the number of
grazing cattle does not exceed the carrying capacity of the land. But inevitably, each herdsman
will want to add cattle to his herd in order to maximize his profit. Despite the fact that each
herdsman knows that adding cattle beyond the carrying capacity will diminish the resource, he
will do it because he alone stands to benefit from the profit, whereas the cost-the damage to the
resource-will be borne by everyone. Eventually, everyone will add more animals to their re-
spective herds, which will lead to overgrazing and will culminate in the destruction of the re-
source. The tragedy is that "[e]ach man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his
herd without limit in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men, rush,
each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons."
Id. Hardin concludes that "[flreedom in the commons brings ruin to all." Id.
2. For a list of acronyms used throughout this Comment, see Appendix A.
3. 16 U.S.C. § 1852(a)(1)(G) (1996).
4. The phrase preferred alternative may be somewhat misleading. The specific rationaliza-
tion program-the three-pie voluntary cooperative program-that NPFMC identified as its pre-
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that would replace the existing License Limitation Program (LLP) for
several BSAI crab fisheries.'6
The preferred alternative is a "three-pie voluntary cooperative
program," which attempts to protect the interests of harvesters (crab
fishermen), processors (corporations who collect the crabs from the
harvesters and prepare them for market), and designated regions that
have a historic interest in the crab fisheries.' Under the three-pie vol-
untary cooperative program, harvesters would be allocated a certain
percentage of the total allowable catch (TAC) of a specific crab fish-
ery. In other words, each harvester would be allowed to catch up to a
certain amount, measured in pounds, of the total number of crabs that
could be caught in any given year. This allocation would come in the
form of an individual fishing quota (IFQ).'
Processors, in turn, would be guaranteed that they would receive
a certain percentage of the total crabs caught.9 These processing privi-
leges-known as individual processing quotas (IPQs)-would mean
that harvesters possessing IFQs would be required to sell their crabs
to certain processors (those holding IPQs), but could not sell to any
ferred alternative, is the program NMPFC liked best of the approaches it considered for the fish-
eries under its jurisdiction. The three-pie voluntary cooperative program is not necessarily the
option NPFMC would have selected in the absence of a Congressional directive to determine the
need for rationalization. See infra Part I.
5. Bering Sea C. opilio (snow crab), Bristol Bay red king crab, West Aleutian Islands
(Adak) golden king crab (brown crab), Eastern Aleutian Islands (Dutch Harbor) golden king
crab (brown crab), Western Aleutian Islands (Adak) red king crab, Bering Sea C. bairdi (Tanner
crab), Pribilof Island red and blue king crab, St. Matthew blue king crab.
6. NPFMC adopted its "preferred alternative for rationalization" in June 2002. North Pa-
cific Fishery Management Council, Bering Sea Crab Rationalization Program Alternatives: Public
Review Draft (May 2002) (on file with author) [hereinafter BERING SEA CRAB
RATIONALIZATION PROGRAM ALTERNATIVES] (on file with author). NPFMC submitted a
summary of its BSAI crab rationalization program to Congress on August 5, 2002, North Pacific
Fishery Management Council, Summary of the North Pacific Fishery Management Council's
Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Crab Rationalization Program Submitted to the United States
Congress, August 2002 5 (Aug. 5, 2002), http://www.fakr.noaa.gov/npfmc/Committees/Crab/
BSAIcrab%20report%20to%20congress802.pdf (last visited Oct. 29, 2002) [hereinafter REPORT
TO CONGRESS]. Essentially, the BERING SEA CRAB RATIONALIZATION PROGRAM
ALTERNATIVES and the REPORT TO CONGRESS are the same documents. The REPORT TO
CONGRESS is a twenty-three page document summarizing the more than 700-page BERING SEA
CRAB RATIONALIZATION PROGRAM ALTERNATIVES. This Comment will cite to either or
both of these sources.
7. REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 6, at 2.
8. Id. at 6. The Magnuson Act defines an IFQas "a Federal permit under a limited access
system to harvest a quantity of fish, expressed by a unit or units representing a percentage of the
total allowable catch of a fishery that may be received or held for exclusive use by a person." 16
U.S.C. § 1802(21) (1996). Individual fishing quotas which are transferable, i.e., quotas which
can be leased or sold to other harvesters, are referred to as "individual transferable quotas"
(ITQs). The terms IFQ and ITQ are used interchangeably throughout this Comment.
9. REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 6, at 12.
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processor who had already met its quota limit."° Finally, the Council
included a regionalization program as part of its preferred alternative
in order to "protect communities from the disruption of the current
pattern of landings and processing that might be caused by changing
the management of the BSAI crab fisheries. . . ."" Under the region-
alization program, certain regions would be guaranteed that processors
"would be required to accept delivery of and process crab in the des-
ignated region."12
Up until October 1, 2002, there was a moratorium on all new
IFQ programs. 3 Although the moratorium expired on October 1,
2002, no new IFQ program can be put into place without approval
from the Secretary of Commerce. 4 At the time of this Comment,
there is still debate over whether the moratorium should be ex-
tended.'" The most controversial aspect surrounding the reauthoriza-
10. See id.
11. Id. at 18.
12. Id. For most of the crab fisheries covered in the preferred alternative, there would be
two regional designations. The North Region would encompass all areas on the Bering Sea north
of 56' 20' N. Latitude. The South Region would encompass all areas not included in the North
Region. Id.
13. "A Council may not submit and the Secretary may not approve or implement before
October 1, 2002, any fishery management plan, plan amendment, or regulation under this Act
which creates a new individual fishing quota program." 16 U.S.C. § 1853(d)(1)(A) (2002).
14. "[A]n IFQ program that included provisions to grant processing quota shares to proc-
essors would require an amendment to the MSA prior to approval by the Secretary of Com-
merce. Similarly, a cooperative program that grants an interest in a fishery to harvesters and/or
processors that are akin to harvester and processor shares would require approval by Congress."
BERING SEA CRAB RATIONALIZATION PROGRAM ALTERNATIVES, supra note 6, at 34.
15. For example, the Alaska Marine Conservation Council advocates that stronger stan-
dards need to be in place to ensure that conservation is enhanced before any new IFQ programs
are allowed. See Press Release, Alaska Marine Conservation Council, House Committee Crip-
ples Fisheries Conservation Law and Hands Over the Public's Resource to Large Corporations,
http://www.akmarine.org/pressmsa.pdf (last visited July 22, 2002) [hereinafter AMCC PRESS
RELEASE]; Alaska Marine Conservation Council, An Open Letter to Senator Stevens, Senator
Murkowski and Congressman Young, at http://www.akmarine.org/letter2.pdf (last visited July
22, 2002). The Marine Fish Conservation Network-a coalition of more than one-hundred en-
vironmental organizations and commercial and recreational fishing associations-"believes that
the IFQ moratorium should be extended, unless and until Congress adopts legislation containing
national standards for the design and conduct of IFQ programs in order to ensure that these pro-
grams contribute to and enhance the conservation and management of our nation's marine fish-
eries." The Marine Fish Conservation Network, Summary of the Marine Fish Conservation Net-
work's Proposed National Standards for Individual Fishing Quota Programs,
http://www.conservefish.org/capitolhill/summary-ifq.html (last visited July 23, 2002). Envi-
ronmental Defense, a national, non-profit environmental law and policy organization, would also
like to see any legislation reauthorizing the Magnuson Act to include "standards to help councils
design IFQ programs that are equitable and consistent with community and conservation inter-
ests." Environmental Defense, however, still supports lifting the moratorium in the absence of
any such standards. News Release, Environmental Defense, House Moves Closer to Ending Ban
on New Fishing Quotas (July 10, 2002), http://www.environmentaldefense.org/pressrelease
.cfm?ContentlD=2178 (last visited July 22, 2002).
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tion of the Act concerns the inclusion of processors' shares as part of
an individual quota system.1
6
Since IPQs are unprecedented in the United States,' 7 this Com-
ment will first discuss some of the legal issues concerning IPQs and
will then consider the benefits and costs of crab rationalization. This
Comment argues that although NPFMC's three-pie voluntary coop-
erative program will likely benefit processors at the expense of har-
vesters, this trade-off is necessary to protect the economic stability of
coastal fishing communities. This Comment concludes, however, that
NPFMC's three-pie voluntary cooperative program should be re-
garded as only one of the steps necessary to protect the crab fisheries
from depletion.
Part II of this Comment provides a brief overview of the history
of the Magnuson Act. Part III describes the current status of the
BSAI crab fisheries and the need for crab rationalization. In Part IV,
this Comment examines NPFMC's preferred alternative-the three-
pie voluntary cooperative program-as set forth in its Bering Sea Crab
Rationalization Program Alternatives: Public Review Draft (May,
Many scientists are also wary of fishing quotas as a means of conserving fishery resources. See
Interview with Ginny Eckert, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Biology, University of Alaska South-
east, Juneau campus, in Juneau, Alaska (July 10, 2002) (on file with author) [hereinafter
INTERVIEW WITH GINNY ECKERT]; National Center for Ecological Analysis and Synthesis,
Scientific Consensus Statement on Marine Reserves and Marine Protected Areas 2,
http://www.nceas.ucsb.edu/Consensus/consensus.pdf (last visited July 10, 2002) (stating that
marine reserves-"areas of the sea completely protected from all extractive activities"-are an
effective way to cope with the problems of exploited species and to improve marine biodiversity
and the overall health of the oceans). See also Testimony Before the House Subcomm. on Fish-
eries Conservation, Wildlife and Oceans (2002) (statement of Dr. Daniel W. Bromley, Ander-
son-Bascom Professor of Applied Economics, University of Wisconsin- Madison), at
http://resourcescommittee.house.gov/107cong/fisheries/2002feb13/bromley.htm (last visited
Mar. 27, 2003) (arguing that IFQs can be a prudent management tool for particular fisheries
only "[i]f there is assurance that harvest levels will not drive stocks to economic or biological ex-
tinction."); SETH MACINKO & DAVID BROMLEY, WHO OWNS AMERICA'S FISHERIES? 21
(2002) (arguing that "an IFQ permit is not a sufficient policy instrument to prevent overfish-
ins.... [t]here is little reason to believe that behavior in IFQ fisheries will differ from the behav-
ior in all other fisheries with regard to long-term protection of the resource.").
16. Although it is outside the scope of this Comment, "[t]he reauthorization debate could
also provide an opportune moment to begin thinking about ways to consolidate the many federal
agencies scattered across the bureaucratic landscape that deal with ocean issues." Oceans in
Trouble, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2003, at § 4, 1. For more on America's need to reorganize the
management of its oceans, see Oceans in Peril, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2003, at A24; Andrew C.
Revkin, U.S. is Urged to Overhaul its Approach to Protecting Oceans, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2003,
at A32.
17. BERING SEA CRAB RATIONALIZATION PROGRAM ALTERNATIVES, supra note 6, at
396 ("no two pie IFQ programs have been implemented in any fisheries to date."). See also
Alaska Marine Conservation Council, Limited Access, available at http:
http://www.akmarine.org/newlimitedaccess.html (last visited January 10, 2003) (describing
NPFMC's proposal as "unprecedented.") [hereinafter AMCC LIMITED ACCESS].
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2002) and Summary of the North Pacific Fishery Management Coun-
cil's Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Crab Rationalization Program
Submitted to the United States Congress, August, 2002. Part V looks
at the legal issues surrounding processor quotas, focusing specifically
on the possible equal protection, takings, and antitrust concerns that a
processor quota system raises. After concluding that NPFMC's IPQ
program should withstand any legal challenges, this Comment, in Part
VI, examines the benefits and costs of rationalization to harvesters,
processors, consumers, and the environment. Although NPFMC's
three-pie voluntary cooperative program will likely benefit processors
at the expense of harvesters, this Comment, in Part VII, argues that
this trade-off is necessary in order to protect the economic stability of
coastal fishing communities. Finally, this Comment concludes that as
an environmental mechanism for ensuring the sustainability of the
crab fisheries, NPFMC's three-pie voluntary cooperative program
should be regarded as a step, but not the final step, towards that goal.
II. HISTORY OF THE MAGNUSON ACT
In 1976, Congress passed the Fishery Conservation and Man-
agement Act,18 in order "to assert U.S. federal authority over non-
U.S.-flagged vessels operating within a zone extending 200 nautical
miles from the U.S. coastline, coincident with ongoing negotiations of
the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea for the same extension of
jurisdiction for all coastal nations."19  In essence, the Act reflected
Congress's belief that "coastal fish stocks would suffer from the trag-
edy of the commons unless the tragedy was averted through the decla-
ration of national sovereignty, an assertion of exclusive property rights
at the national level."2 The Act also established eight Regional Fish-
ery Management Councils21 ("Regional Councils" or "Councils") to
develop, administer, and revise fishery management plans
("FMPs")-plans which regulate fishing for the species in the Coun-
18. It was renamed as the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act in 1980
and as the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act in 1996.
19. COMM. TO REVIEW INDIVIDUAL FISHING QUOTAS, OCEAN STUDIES BOARD,
COMM'N ON GEOSCIENCES, ENV'T, & RES., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SHARING THE
FISH: TOWARD A NATIONAL POLICY ON INDIVIDUAL FISHING QUOTAS 15 (1999),
http://bob.nap.edu/books/0309063302/html/ (last visited May 2, 2003) [hereinafter SHARING
THE FISH]. Before the Act created the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), foreign vessels were
allowed to fish waters beyond the twelve-mile territorial limit.
20. Alison Rieser, Prescriptions for the Commons: Environmental Scholarship and the Fishing
Quotas Debate, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 393, 406 (1999).
21. 16 U.S.C. § 1852(a)(1)-(8) (1996). NPFMC is one of these eight Regional Fishery
Management Councils.
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cils' respective geographical jurisdictions in order to prevent overfish-
ing and achieve "optimum yield.
22
Initially, the Councils attempted to control fishing pressure using
traditional forms of fishery management authorized under the Act,
such as closed areas, closed seasons, size limits, trip limits, crew limits,
and gear limits. 23 During the 1990-96 period, however, in response to
the international trend in fisheries management, the policy regarding
the protection of fish stocks shifted from an emphasis on open access
to fisheries to a focus on limited access fishing licenses, such as indi-
vidual transferable quotas (ITQs). By late 1996, the Regional Coun-
cils had adopted ITQs for three fisheries: the Atlantic surf clam and
ocean quahog fishery, the Alaska halibut and sablefish fixed gear fish-
ery, and the South Atlantic wreckfish fishery.24 Many Alaskan fish-
ermen, however, "feared that the adoption of [new] ITQs would place
them at a disadvantage with respect to a larger offshore trawler based
in Washington,"2 who would bid up the prices and purchase quota
shares.26 Thus, despite the success of ITQs in helping to deal with
overcapitalization,27 the 1996 Sustainable Fisheries Act, which reau-
thorized the Magnuson Act, imposed a moratorium on all new ITQs
22. 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(1) (1996). Once a Council adopts an FMP or amendment to an
existing FMP, which must be consistent with several National Standards enumerated by the Act,
16 U.S.C. § 1851, the FMP or amendment is submitted along with proposed implementing regu-
lations to the Secretary of Commerce for review. 16 U.S.C. § 1853(c) (1996). If the Secretary
finds that the FMP or amendment is consistent with the National Standards and other applicable
law, the Secretary then promulgates the regulations. 16U.S.C.§ 1853(c) (1996).
According to the Act:
[t]he term 'optimum,' with respect to the yield from a fishery, means the amount of
fish which-
(A) will provide the greatest overall benefit to the Nation, particularly with respect to
food production and recreational opportunities, and taking into account the protection
of marine ecosystems;
(B) is prescribed as such on the basis of the maximum sustainable yield from the fish-
ery, as reduced by any relevant economic, social, or ecological factor; and
(C) in the case of an overfished fishery, provides for rebuilding to a level consistent
with producing the maximum sustainable yield in such fishery.
16 U.S.C. § 1802(28) (1996).
23. See 16 U.S.C. § 1853 (1996).
24. See Rieser, supra note 20, at 408; Alison Reiser, Property Rights and Ecosystem Man-
agement in U.S. Fisheries: Contracting for the Commons?, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 813, 822 (1997).
25. David A. Dana, Overcoming the Political Tragedy of the Commons: Lessons Learned from
the Reauthorization of the Magnuson Act, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 833, 845 (1997).
26. Id.; see also Shi-Ling Hsu & James E. Wilen, Ecosystem Management and the 1996 Sus-
tainable Fisheries Act, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 799, 808 (1997).
27. See Rieser, supra note 20, at 412-14 (discussing the Alaskan halibut and sablefish fish-
eries). In addition to conserving fishery resources, ITQs have also proven to be economically
efficient. ITQs reduce the incentive for fishermen to purchase bigger boats and more equipment
and to fish during unsafe conditions. SHARING THE FISH, supra note 19, at 4.
2003] A Less Tragic Commons
until October 1, 2000.28 In December 2000, the Consolidated Appro-
priations Act of 2001 extended the moratorium until October 1,
2002.29 The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2001 also included
an express directive to the North Pacific Fishery Management Council
(NPFMC) to "examine fisheries under its jurisdiction to determine
whether rationalization is needed and provide an analysis of several
specific approaches to rationalization."3 (This analysis is the Bering
28. 16 U.S.C. § 1853(d)(1)(A) (1996). Alaska Senator Ted Stevens was the driving force
behind the moratorium and used his political clout to hold up reauthorization of the Magnuson
Act until a moratorium on the adoption by any fishery council of any new ITQ program was
added to the Sustainable Fisheries Act.
Note, however, that not all fishermen were in favor of the moratorium. "[B]ecause [ITQ] pro-
grams create a valuable property right that can be sold by those choosing to sell out, substantial
numbers of fishermen ... support [ITQs]. Some fishermen have also supported [ITQs] because
they see them as the only way to manage fisheries effectively and avoid the inevitable growth in
fishing capacity that occurs under open access." Hsu & Wilen, supra note 26, at 809. For a
thorough analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of ITQ programs, see Eugene H. Buck,
available at Individual Transferable Quotas in Fishery Management, CRS Report #95-849,
http://cnie.org/NLE/CRSreports/Marine/mar-l.cfm (last visited June 20, 2002) (discussing
the pros and cons of ITQS with respect to capitalization and consolidation; conservation; seafood
market and price; safety; enforcement and administration; employment and community stability;
and equity and wealth creation). See also Richard B. Allen, Transferable Fishing Rights are Best
for Fish and Fishermen, National Fisheries Conservation Center, available at http://www.nfcc-
fisheries.com/ir.povcl9.html (last visited June 20, 2002); John Bundy, Lessons from the CDQ
Program for Quota-Based Management, National Fisheries Conservation Center, available at
http://www.nfcc-fisheries.com/ir-pov_c22.html (last visited June 20, 2002); Penelope D. Dal-
ton, National Marine Fisheries Position on Individual Fishing Quotas, National Fisheries Conser-
vation Center, available at http://www.nfcc-fisheries.com/ir-pov-cl6.html (last visited June 20,
2002); Dave Fraser, The Benefits of Rights-Based Fishing Cooperatives in the Pollock Fishery, Na-
tional Fisheries Conservation Center, http://www.nfcc-fisheries.com/irpovclO.html (last vis-
ited June 20, 2002); Rod Fujita, The Moratorium on Individual Transferable Quotas Should be
Lifted, National Fisheries Conservation Center, available at http://www.nfcc-
fisheries.com/ir.povscl4.html (last visited June 20, 2002); Mike Hagler, Some Greenpeace Views
on ITQs, National Fisheries Conservation Center, available at http://www.nfcc-
fisheries.com/irpovclS.html (last visited June 20, 2002); Rod Moore, Sharing the Costs and
Benefits, National Fisheries Conservation Center, available at http://www.nfcc-
fisheries.com/ir .pov.c21 .html (last visited June 20, 2002); Paul W. Parker, Privatization Didn't
Work for Rangelands and It Won't Work for New England Fisheries, National Fisheries Conserva-
tion Center, available at http://www.nfcc-fisheries.com/ir-pov-cl8.html (last visited June 20,
2002); Jeff Pike, Quota-Based Programs, National Fisheries Conservation Center, available at
http://www.nfcc-fisheries.com/ir_pov-c20.html (last visited June 20, 2002); Carl Safina, Indi-
vidual Fishery Quotas: Allocation, Conservation, or Both?, National Fisheries Conservation Cen-
ter, available at http://www.nfcc-fisheries.com/ir-pov-cl3.html (last visited June 20, 2002);
Beth Stewart, Style or Substance?, National Fisheries Conservation Center, available at
http://www.nfcc-fisheries.com/ir.-pov-c08.html (last visited June 20, 2002); Bob Storrs, Una-
laska Locals are Wary of ITQs, National Fisheries Conservation Center, available at
http://www.nfcc-fisheries.com/ir-pov-cl 1.html (last visited June 20, 2002); Mike Weber, Ob-
stacles to ITQs, National Fisheries Conservation Center, available at http://www.nfcc-
fisheries.com/ir_povc23.html (last visited June 20, 2002).
29. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763.
30. BERING SEA CRAB RATIONALIZATION PROGRAM ALTERNATIVES, supra note 6, at
34. The specific legislative language is:
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Sea Crab Rationalization Program Alternatives: Public Review Draft
and the subsequent Summary of the North Pacific Fishery Manage-
ment Council's Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Crab Rationalization
Program Submitted to the United States Congress, August 2002.)31
The North Pacific Fishery Management Council shall examine the fisheries under its
jurisdiction, particularly the Gulf of Alaska groundfish and Bering Sea crab fisheries,
to determine whether rationalization is needed. In particular, the North Pacific
Council shall analyze individual fishing quotas, processor quotas, cooperatives, and
quotas held by communities. The analysis should include an economic analysis of the
impact of all options on communities and processors as well as the fishing fleets. The
North Pacific Council shall present its analysis to the appropriations and authorizing
committees of the Senate and House of Representatives in a timely manner.
Id.
31. The National Ocean and Atmospheric Association General Counsel (NOAA GC)
clarified the scope of the analysis required by Congress:
[Tlhe statute language require[s] the Council to analyze the rationalization options
identified (i.e., individual fishing quotas, processor quotas, cooperatives, and quotas
held by communities) and [does] not appear to give the Council any discretion to ex-
clude any of the options from the analysis. Furthermore,.... each option needs to be
considered on an equal analytical footing. Finally, . .. the Council could prepare a
threshold comparative analysis of the different options that considered the impact of
the options on the communities, processors and the fishing fleets but that analysis did
not need to consider all details required for Council adoption and Secretary of Com-
merce approval of a rationalization program.
Id. The other rationalization alternatives which the Council considered included "an IFQ pro-
gram that would allocate harvest shares only, a two pie IFQ program that would allocate har-
vester shares and processing shares, and several cooperative programs that would allocate shares
to harvesters with different levels of delivery commitments from harvesters to processors."
REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 6, at 3. The Council determined, however, that "each of
these other alternatives would inadequately protect the interests of historic dependents on the
fisheries, neglecting either the interests of an entire group or an identifiable segment of a group."
Id. This Comment will not discuss these rationalization options which the Council considered.
For an in-depth description of alternatives for rationalization and the elements and options for
analysis, see BERING SEA CRAB RATIONALIZATION PROGRAM ALTERNATIVES, supra note 6,
at 10-33. In addition, this Comment will not make an economic comparison of one-pie IFQ
programs, where quota shares are issued only to the harvesting sector, and two-pie IFQ pro-
grams, where separate pools of quota shares are allocated to the harvesting sector and the proc-
essing sector. For a discussion of the economic effects of harvester-only IFQs as compared to
the two-pie approach, see Hearing on Individual Fishing Quotas Before House Subcomm. on Fisher-
ies Conservation, Wildlife, and Oceans, Comm. of Resources (2002) (statement of proposed testi-
mony of Robert Halvorsen, Professor of Economics, Dep't of Economics, University of Wash-
ington, on behalf of the Crab Rationalization and Buyback Group),
http://resourcescommittee.house.gov/107cong/fisheries/2002febl3/halvorsen.htm (last visited
January 5,2003) (recommending that "national standards for fishery conservation and manage-
ment not require that IPQs or other specific compensation mechanisms be included in future
fishery management plans and regulations); Hearing on Individual Fishing Quotas Before House
Subcomm. on Fisheries Conservation, Wildlife, and Oceans, Comm. of Resources (2002) (statement
of Scott C. Matulich, Professor, Dep't of Agricultural Economics, Washington State University),
available at http://resourcescommittee.house.gov/107cong/fisheries/2002feb13/matulich.htm
(last visited January 5, 2003) (stating that "a quota allocation only to harvesters damages co-
dependent processors"); Scott C. Matulich et al., Reconsidering the Initial Allocation of ITQs: The
Search for a Pareto-Safe Allocation between Fishing and Processing Sectors, 75 LAND ECON. 203
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On July 10, 2002, the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on
Resources approved the Magnuson-Stevens Act (H.R. 4749) lifting
the moratorium on individual quota systems.32 Although an amend-
ment by Congressman George Miller (D-CA) was added to the bill to
prohibit IPQs, an amendment by Congressman Jay Inslee (D-WA)
exempted the North Pacific from Congressman Miller's amendment.33
On October 1, 2002, the moratorium on new individual fishing quota
(IFQ) programs expired. Nothing has come of H.R. 4749 since July
10, 2002.
III. THE NEED FOR CRAB RATIONALIZATION
A. Decline of the Crab Fisheries
According to the Alaska Marine Conservation Council, "[n]early
every crab species [in Alaska] is at extreme low abundance."34 This,
however, is not a recent phenomenon. In the past twenty years, the
following crab fisheries in Alaska have collapsed: the Kodiak red king
fishery closed in 1984;35 the Aleutian Islands red king36 and Norton
Sound red king fisheries were both considered "diminished" as of
March 2000; the Gulf of Alaska tanner fishery closed in 1995; the Ber-
ing Sea tanner (bairdi) fishery closed in 1997; and the St. Matthew
blue king fishery was declared "overfished"37 in 1999 and closed the
(1999) (analyzing how an "allocation of quota shares only to vessels is an unnecessarily crude
policy instrument that will strand nonvertically integrated inshore processing investments").
32. Press Release, News from Congressman James V. Hansen, Chairman, Comm. on Re-
sources, U.S. House of Representatives, After 7 Hearings, House Resources Committee Reautho-
rizes Comprehensive Fisheries Act, 23-17 (July 11, 2002), http://resourcescommittee.house.gov/
press/2002/2002_071OMagnuson.htm (last visited July 22, 2002).
33. AMCC PRESS RELEASE, supra note 15.
34. Alaska Marine Conservation Council, Magnuson-Stevens Act: Update, SEA CHANGE 3
(2002), http://www.akmarine.org/newsummer02newsletter.pdf [hereinafter SEA CHANGE].
35. FRANCINE J. BENNIS, ALASKA MARINE CONSERVATION COUNCIL, RED KING
CRAB OF THE KODIAK ARCHIPELAGO 1 (2000).
36. The Aleutian Islands red king crab fishery is comprised of the Western Aleutian Is-
lands (or Adak) red king crab fishery and the Eastern Aleutian Islands (Dutch Harbor) red king
crab fishery. Last year, the Adak red king crab fishery was open in a limited area-the Petrel
Bank area of the western Aleutian Islands. Press Release, Alaska Department of Fish & Game,
Petrel Bank Red King Crab Fishery Pot Limits and Vessel Registration (Oct. 4, 2002), at
http://www.cf.adfg.state.ak.us/region4/news/2002/NRIO0402.htm (last visited Mar. 27,
2003).
37. The term "overfished" means "a rate or level of fishing mortality that jeopardizes the
capacity of a fishery to produce MSY [the maximum sustainable yield-the largest long term
average catch or yield that can be taken from a stock or stock complex under prevailing ecological
and environmental conditions] on a continuing basis." BERING SEA CRAB RATIONALIZATION
PROGRAM ALTERNATIVES, supra note 6, at 41.
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same year.38 In addition, during the 1980s and 90s, a number of crab
fisheries were closed for one or more years due to low abundance: the
Bristol Bay red king crab fishery, which was closed from 1994-95; the
Pribilof Islands red king crab fishery, which was closed from 1988-92;
and the Pribilof blue king crab fishery, which was closed from 1988-
38. BERING SEA CRAB RATIONALIZATION PROGRAM ALTERNATIVES, supra note 6, at 2.
In addition, the Bering Sea opilio (snow crab) fishery was declared overfished in 1999. Id. At
the time of Bennis's publication, this fishery was predicted to close in 2001. BENNIS, supra note
35, at 1. Despite this prediction about the future of the Bering Sea C. opilio (snow crab) fishery,
the fishery did not close in 2001. Although the fishery peaked in 1991, declined until 1996,
achieved moderate recovery in years 1997-99, and fell to its lowest level since 1984 in 2000, the
fishery has remained open. See Commercial Fisheries, Fisheries Statistics & Economics Divi-
sion, Office of Science & Technology, National Marine Fisheries Service, Annual Commercial
Landings Statistics, available at http://www.st.nmfs.gov/stl/commercial/landings/annual-
landings.html (last visited Sept. 2, 2002) (providing landings for snow crabs from 1981-2000);
Division of Commercial Fisheries, Alaska Dep't of Fish & Game, 1996 Preliminary Alaska Com-
mercial Shellfish Catches & Exvessel Values, available at http://www.cf.adfg.state.ak.us/geninfo
/shellfsh/96_value.htm (last visited July 22, 2002) (listing the total pounds caught for the Bering
sea C. opilio and in Bering Sea C. bairdi 1996); Division of Commercial Fisheries, Alaska Dep't
of Fish & Game, 1997 Preliminary Alaska Commercial Shellfish Catches & Exvessel Values,
http://www.cf.adfg.state.ak.us/geninfo/shellfsh/97_Ivalue.htm (last visited July 22, 2002) (list-
ing the total pounds caught for the Bering sea opilio in 1997 and confirming that the Bering Sea
C. bairdi fishery had closed); Division of Commercial Fisheries, Alaska Dep't of Fish & Game,
1998 Preliminary Alaska Commercial Shellfish Catches & Exvessel Values, available at
http://www.cf.adfg.state.ak.us/geninfo/shellfsh/98_value.htm (last visited July 22, 2002) (list-
ing the total pounds caught for the Bering sea opilio in 1998 and confirming that the Bering Sea
C. bairdi fishery had closed); Division of Commercial Fisheries, Alaska Dep't of Fish & Game,
1999 Preliminary Alaska Commercial Shellfish Catches & Exvessel Values, available at
http://www.cf.adfg.state.ak.us/geninfo/shellfsh/99_7value.htm (last visited July 22, 2002) (list-
ing the total pounds caught for the Bering sea opilio in 1999 and confirming that the Bering Sea
C. bairdi fishery had closed); Division of Commercial Fisheries, Alaska Dep't of Fish and Game,
2001 Bering Sea Snow Crab (C. opilio) Fishery Summary, http://www.cf.adfg.state.ak.us/region4
/shellfsh/crabs/catchval/Olsnowc/op-sum0l.htm (last visited July 17, 2002) (stating that the
Bering Sea snow crab (C. opilio) fishery was open in 2001 from January 15 until February 14);
Email Correspondence from Gordon Kruse, Professor of Fisheries, School of Fisheries and
Ocean Sciences, University of Alaska- Fairbanks, to Avi Brisman (July 17, 2002, 12:19:12 ADT)
(on file with author) (confirming that the Bering Sea snow crab (C. opilio) fishery was open in
2002); 2002 Bering Sea Snow Crab Estimate Summary by Day, available at
http://www.cf.adfg.state.ak.us/region4/shellfsh/crabs/opilioinfo.pdf (last visited July 17, 2002)
(providing estimated data on total pounds of snow crab caught for the period of January 16,
2002-February 5, 2002).
The fact that the eastern Bering Sea snow crab fishery did not close in 2001 should not be
interpreted as an indication that the fishery has recovered or is recovering. According to Profes-
sor Ginny Eckert of the University of Alaska Southeast, the fishery is still in a perilous state
INTERVIEW WITH GINNY ECKERT, supra note 15. For a discussion of the status of the red king
crab Bristol Bay stocks and Norton Sound and Aleutian Island stocks; blue king crab Pribilof
District stocks and St. Matthew stocks; golden king crab Bering Sea and Aleutian Island stocks;
tanner crab Easter Bering Sea stocks and Aleutian Island stocks; snow crab Easter Bering Sea
stocks, including charts of the abundance of legal males, pre-season guideline harvest levels, and
total catches for the period 1980-97, see North Pacific Fishery Management Council, King and
Tanner Crabs of the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Areas: Species Profile (1998),
http://www.fakr.noaa.gov/npfmc/Reports/crbspeci.pdf (last visited July 3, 2002).
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94.39 These collapses and closures have resulted, in part, from a vari-
ety of natural occurrences and human activities, including "[c]hanging
oceanographic conditions from those that are favorable to crab pro-
ductivity to those that are not favorable," intensive fishing of declining
crab populations, "bycatch of crab in other fisheries," and damage to
sensitive habitat. 40 To exacerbate the problem of decline, there is still
a relatively poor understanding of crab biology and ecology.4' Most
agree, however, that the previous and current management practices,
the Vessel Moratorium Program (VMP) and License Limitation Pro-
gram (LLP) respectively, were and will continue to be insufficient if
crab fisheries are to be maintained and restored.
39. BERING SEA CRAB RATIONALIZATION PROGRAM ALTERNATIVES, supra note 6, at 2.
Both fisheries have been closed from 1999 to the present. Id. at 60.
40. BENNIS, supra note 35, at 1. "Bycatch is the indiscriminate catching of fish and marine
life other than those a fishing vessel intends to capture. Marine life caught as bycatch is usually
returned to the sea dead, or dying." Chris Zeman, Fisheries Program Counsel, American
Oceans Campaign, The Devastating Effect of Fisheries Management After Five Years of the Sus-
tainable Fisheries Act, http://www.conservefish.org/Act.pdf (last visited Sept. 2, 2002). To il-
lustrate the severity of the problem of bycatch in general, consider that
in the North Pacific, fishermen in the groundfish and halibut fisheries continue to
throw away nearly 350 million of pounds of dead or dying fish as bycatch each year-
more than 60 percent as many fish as were landed in all of New England [in 2000]. In
New England, bycatch in the Gulf of Maine cod fishery in 1999 is estimated at nearly
twice the 1999 annual catch level.
Id. According to the Alaska Marine Conservation Council, in Alaska, "[a]t least 1,000 species of
fish and other marine life totaling over 300 million pounds are thrown overboard dead as bycatch
annually." SEA CHANGE, supra note 34, at 3. Note, however, that bycatch in the crab fisheries
is very different from bycatch in the trawl or longline fisheries. While bycatch is, nonetheless, a
problem in the crab fisheries, the numbers do not match those of the groundfish and halibut
fisheries mentioned above.
Another contributing factor is ghost fishing-the "[i]ncidental capture of fish caused by gear that
is lost or abandoned at sea," SHARING THE FISH, supra note 19, at 272.
41. BENNIS, supra note 35, at 15; SEA CHANGE, supra note 34, at 3 ("scientists... don't
know what the habitat requirements are for any of our managed fish species."); INTERVIEW
WITH GINNY ECKERT, supra note 15 ("[n]o one can argue that the [snow crab] fishery is in de-
cline.., we [marine biologists] just don't know what [has] caused the decline."); see also BERING
SEA CRAB RATIONALIZATION PROGRAM ALTERNATIVES, supra note 6, at 37, 49
("[i]nsufficient evidence exists to determine the cause of the snow crab decline.").
42. See BERING SEA CRAB RATIONALIZATION PROGRAM ALTERNATIVES, supra note 6,
at 10 (admitting that while the VMP and LLP were "important initial steps toward the Council's
ultimate goal of developing a more comprehensive and rational management system for the BSAI
crab fisheries .... [The proposed three-pie voluntary cooperative program is] intended to pro-
vide a management system for the BSAI crab fisheries that address[es] the problems of an open
access fishery in a more comprehensive manner" (emphasis added)).
One should note that, in addition to the VMP and LLP, there are other mechanisms in place to
help preserve the crab fisheries. For example, the State of Alaska prescribes gear modifications
(such as escape rings and tunnel size), which are established by regulation "to inhibit the bycatch
of small crab, female crab, and other species of crab." BERING SEA CRAB RATIONALIZATION
PROGRAM ALTERNATIVES, supra note 6, at 38. This Comment will not discuss the sufficiency
of these gear modifications, nor will it discuss the observer program, which requires observers,
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B. Vessel Moratorium Program
Prior to 1995, the Bering Sea/Aleutian Islands (BSAI) crab fish-
eries were managed on an "open access" basis.43 This meant that ac-
cess to the fisheries was not restricted (i.e., there were no license limi-
tations, quotas, or other mechanisms that would limit the number of
people harvesting crabs and the amount of crabs that an individual
fisherman could take)." Essentially, anyone with the financial re-
sources to purchase a vessel and equipment could become a crab fish-
erman and harvest as much as he was able. Faced with the rapid
growth and overcapitalization of the BSAI crab fisheries, the North
Pacific Fishery Management Council (NPFMC) implemented the
VMP in September 1995 to "stem the flow of additional, unneeded
vessels and capital investment into the [BSAI crab] fisheries under the
Council's authority."4 Under the VMP, those desiring access to the
crab fisheries were required to procure a moratorium permit issued by
the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS).46 The permits were
issued based on a vessel's previous history in the fishery. If a vessel
made a "legal landing of a moratorium species [such as red king, blue
king and opilio tanner crab] during the qualifying period of January 1,
1988 through February 9, 1992," it qualified for a moratorium permit
for that species.47 If a vessel qualified for a moratorium permit for one
species, but not for another, the VMP allowed the vessel to cross over
to other fisheries, subject to some conditions.48 The VMP also al-
lowed moratorium permits to be transferred so that vessel owners
could make improvements to their vessels.49 Although the VMP was
successful in limiting access to the BSAI crab fisheries, it "was not ex-
pected to resolve the problem of excess harvesting capacity in the
groundfish and BSAI crab fisheries."5" Rather than acting as a means
of resource conservation, it functioned as an "interim management
measure to provide temporary industry stability by restricting the
who collect biological data and monitor vessel compliance with regulations, on all vessels proc-
essing BSAI crabs.
43. See BERING SEA CRAB RATIONALIZATION PROGRAM ALTERNATIVES, supra note 6,
at 2-4.
44. SHARING THE FISH, supra note 19, at 275.
45. BERING SEA CRAB RATIONALIZATION PROGRAM ALTERNATIVES, supra note 6, at 3.
46. Id. (Moratorium permits were required for access to the groundfish and halibut fisher-
ies as well.)
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number of vessels allowed to participate in the affected fisheries and
limiting increases in fishing capacity."
51
C. License Limitation Program
The next step in the process towards a "comprehensive and ra-
tional management program for the [crab] fisheries ' 12 was the License
Limitation Program (LLP), which replaced the Vessel Moratorium
Program (VMP) on January 1, 2000." Under the LLP, any and all
persons who want to participate in the regulated fisheries 4 need to
hold a valid crab license issued under the LLP.5  Because the applica-
tion period for applying for an LLP license has closed, however-it
ran from September 13, 1999 until December 17, 1999 56 -entry into
these fisheries has been limited.57  The next subsection provides an
overview of how licenses under the LLP were initially allocated.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1-2.
53. Id. at 4. The proposed rule for the LLP received approval from the Secretary of Com-
merce on September 12, 1997 and the final rule was published in the Federal Register on Octo-
ber 1, 1998. See 50 C.F.R. § 679.4(k) (2002).
54. The Pribilof red king crab and Pribilof blue king crab fishery, the Norton Sound red
king crab and Norton Sound blue king crab fishery, the C. opilio and C. bairdi fisheries, the St.
Matthew blue king crab fishery, the Aleutian Islands brown king fishery, the Aleutian Islands
red king crab fishery, and the Bristol Bay red king crab fishery.
55. National Marine Fisheries Service, The North Pacific License Limitation Program
(LLP), at http://www.fakr.noaa.gov/ram/llp.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2002) [hereinafter THE
NORTH PACIFIC LICENSE LIMITATION PROGRAM]; Email Correspondence from Mark Fina,
Senior Economist, North Pacific Fishery Management Council, to Avi Brisman (Aug. 29, 2002,
16:43:32 ADT) (on file with author) (hereinafter EMAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH MARK
FINA, AUG. 29, 2002].
56. National Marine Fisheries Service, About the License Limitation Program and Instruc-
tions for Applying for a License 2, 5 (1999), http://www.fakr.noaa.gov/ram/AboutInstLLP.pdf
(last visited Nov. 14, 2002) [hereinafter ABOUT THE LICENSE LIMITATION PROGRAM].
57. A small number of netv licenses have been and may continue to be issued from late-
filed claims. BERING SEA CRAB RATIONALIZATION PROGRAM ALTERNATIVES, supra note 6,
at 39. But for all intents and purposes, the only way in which someone who currently does not
hold an LLP license can harvest crabs commercially is for him to procure a valid LLP license
from someone who does. Under the LLP, permanent LLP licenses are transferable from the
person holding the license to other persons, pursuant to a number of rules, which include:
(1) [l]icenses may only be transferred to qualified persons [e.g., the transferee must be
a U.S. citizen];
(2) [u]nless they are initially issued, no person can hold more than ten (10) groundfish
licenses or five (5) crab licenses at any one time;
(3) [a] license holder may not voluntarily transfer his or her license more than one
time in a calendar year;
(4)[t]he transfer process will be used to designate a different vessel on the license; such
a 'designation' (or 're-designation') of the vessel will be considered a 'voluntary trans-
fer' and will only be approved once a calendar year;
(5) [1]icenses may transfer by 'operation of law' (foreclosure, by inheritance, etc.);
such transfers (which may or may not include a vessel) will not be considered a 'vol-
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1. Eligibility for an LLP License
When the LLP replaced the VMP, everyone, including those
who held a moratorium permit under the VMP, was required to apply
for an LLP license; there was no guarantee that holding a moratorium
permit would result in an LLP license. 8 In order to qualify for an
LLP permit, the applicant was required to own a vessel and provide
documentation that the vessel harvested crabs during two periods-
the general qualification period (GQP) and the endorsement qualifica-
tion period (EQP)."9 The GQP, as the name implies, applied to all
crab species. Thus for the period of January 1, 1988 through June 27,
1992-a period covering the qualification period for the VMP 6 -all
that a person needed to show was that his vessel harvested some spe-
cies of crab on a consistent basis during this time.6 The purpose of
this requirement was to ensure that only vessel owners with past de-
pendence on the fishery qualified.62 Unlike the GQP, the EQP was
untary transfer' for purposes of limiting the number of allowable transfers in a calen-
dar year;
(6) [e]ndorsements on licenses are not severable from the license; and
(7) [flor at least the first three years of the program, a person who receives both a
groundfish license and a crab license derived from the qualifying history of one vessel
may not transfer one without transferring both ....
ABOUT THE LICENSE LIMITATION PROGRAM, supra note 56, at 4; THE NORTH PACIFIC
LICENSE LIMITATION PROGRAM, supra note 55.
58. ABOUT THE LICENSE LIMITATION PROGRAM, supra note 56, at 2. There were, and
continue to be, a number of exceptions to the LLP license requirement. The following types of
vessels do not require LLP permits:
(1) vessels that do not exceed 26 feet in Length Overall (LOA) in the Gulf of Alaska;
(2) vessels that do not exceed 32 feet LOA in the BSAI; (3) vessels that do not exceed
60 feet LOA, and that are using jig gear (but no more than 5 jig machines, one line
per machine, and 15 hooks per line) are exempt from the LLP requirements in the
BSAI; and, (4) certain vessels constructed for, and used exclusively in, Community
Development Quota fisheries.
Id. at 2, n.1.
59. BERING SEA CRAB RATIONALIZATION PROGRAM ALTERNATIVES, supra note 6, at 4.
"Applicants who own[ed] a vessel's fishing history, and who were not the owner(s) of the vessel
on June 17, 1995, [were required to] demonstrate their ownership of the fishing history by pre-
senting a 'clear and unambiguous' contract for the sale of the fishing history that separate[d] the
history from the vessel (or by the sale of the vessel in which the vessel's fishing history [was] ex-
plicitly excluded from the contract by which the vessel was conveyed to a purchaser)." ABOUT
THE LICENSE LIMITATION PROGRAM, supra note 56, at 3.
60. BERING SEA CRAB RATIONALIZATION PROGRAM ALTERNATIVES, supra note 6, at 4.
61. "Alternatively, a vessel satisfies the GQP requirement if it has a documented crab har-
vest between January 1, 1988 and December 31, 1994 provided it has landing of any king or
Tanner crab species between February 10, 1992 and December 11, 1994 and a documented har-
vest or groundfish between January 1, 1998 and February 9, 1992. Vessels that participated in
the Norton Sound red and blue king crab fisheries and the Pribilof red and blue king crab fisher-
ies are exempt from the GQP requirement." BERING SEA CRAB RATIONALIZATION
PROGRAM ALTERNATIVES, supra note 6, at 4.
62. Id.
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species specific. For example, if the applicant wanted to harvest
Pribilof red king crab and Pribilof blue king crabs, he needed to show
that he participated in one harvest between January 1, 1993 and De-
cember 31, 1994.63 If the applicant wanted to harvest Aleutian Islands
brown king crabs, he needed to show that he participated in three
harvests between January 1, 1992 and December 31, 1994.64 The
purpose for the EQP requirement was to ensure that only vessel own-
ers with recent participation in the fishery qualified.65
On September 24, 2001, NMFS issued Amendment Ten to the
Fishery Management Plan (FMP) for the Commercial King and Tan-
ner Crab Fisheries in the Bering Sea and the Aleutian Islands
(Amendment 10), which added a recent participation requirement to
the eligibility requirements for a crab species LLP license.66 Amend-
ment 10 requires that those holding LLP licenses provide documenta-
tion of a harvest during the recent participation period (RPP), which
extended from January 1, 1996 through February 7, 1998.67 The pur-
63. Id. at 5; ABOUT THE LICENSE LIMITATION PROGRAM, supra note 56, at 19.
64. BERING SEA CRAB RATIONALIZATION PROGRAM ALTERNATIVES, supra note 6, at 5;
ABOUT THE LICENSE LIMITATION PROGRAM, supra note 56, at 19. For Norton Sound red
king crab and Norton Sound blue kind crabs, the required number of harvests is one, and the
endorsement qualification period is from January 1, 1993 through December 31, 1994. Id. For
C. opilio and C. bairdi, the required number of harvests is three, and the endorsement qualifica-
tion period is January 1, 1992 through December 31, 1994. Id. For St. Matthew blue king crab,
the required number of harvests is one, and the endorsement qualification period is from January
1, 1992 through December 31, 1994. Id. For Aleutian Islands red king crabs, the required
number of harvests is one, and the endorsement qualification period is from January 1, 1992
through December 31, 1994. Id. For Bristol Bay red king crabs, the required number of har-
vests is one, and the endorsement qualification period is from January 1, 1991 through Decem-
ber 31, 1994. Id.
65. BERING SEA CRAB RATIONALIZATION PROGRAM ALTERNATIVES, supra note 6, at 4.
66. Fisheries of the Exclusive Economic Zone Off Alaska; License Limitation Program, 66
Fed. Reg. 48,813, 48,814 (Sept. 24, 2001) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 679). The rule took
effect at the beginning of the 2002 fishing season. BERING SEA CRAB RATIONALIZATION
PROGRAM ALTERNATIVES, supra note 6, at 5.
67. Fisheries of the Exclusive Economic Zone Off Alaska; License Limitation Program, 66
Fed. Reg. 48,813, 48,814 (Sept. 24, 2001) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 679). BERING SEA
CRAB RATIONALIZATION PROGRAM ALTERNATIVES, supra note 6, at 5. The RPP also applies
to those individuals who hold "interim" permits. Following the close of the application period in
December 1999, interim permits were issued "if any part of a person's claim [was] contested."
Id. at 39. Many interim permits still exist-of the 395 crab licenses that currently exist, 113 are
interim licenses. Id. NMFS continues to make determinations as to whether these claims are
valid. Where NMFS determines enough information exists to support the claim, it will grant the
license, provided the applicant also satisfies the new RPP requirement as well.
The RPP does not apply to:
(1) A person who only qualifies for a Norton Sound red and blue king crab endorse-
ment [i.e., someone who wishes to harvest only Norton Sound crabs];
(2) [a] person whose qualifying vessel is less than 60 ft. LOA [length overall];
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pose of the RPP is to "preserv[e] activity reductions in the crab fisher-
ies."68 It ensures both that licensed persons inactive in the crab fishery
since 1995 will not use those licenses to harvest and that they will not
transfer their licenses to new entrants.69
2. Problems with the LLP
The problem with the LLP (like the problem with the VMP)
does not lie in the entry mechanism. Issuing licenses based on fishing
history has proven to be an effective means for limiting the number of
vessels permitted to harvest crabs. Rather, the problem lies in the fact
that under the LLP, there is no limit to the number of crabs an indi-
vidual can catch during the season.7 Currently, the BSAI crab fisher-
ies are managed using guideline harvest levels (GHLs), or catch limits,
which are set for each crab species by the Alaska Department of Fish
& Game (ADF&G) prior to the opening of the species' respective sea-
sons.71 ADF&G derives the GHLs for most crab stocks by taking the
data from annual surveys of the crab stocks, estimating the number of
male crabs that will reach maturity, and then setting a target catch, in
pounds, based on these estimates to prevent depletion of the stocks.7
ADF&G then projects the length of the season based on the estimated
time for the GHL to be fully harvested.73 Once the season opens, ves-
sels communicate with ADF&G via marine telex e-mail or VHS radio
to report their catches.74 Based on these in-season reports, ADF&G
can adjust the length of the season as well as the GHL, if the reports
suggest that the surveys under- or over-estimated the crab popula-
tions.75 Once the GHL is reached, ADF&G closes the fishery by
(3) [a] person whose qualifying vessel was lost or destroyed during the RPP but which
made a documented harvest of crab species during the period after the vessel was lost
or destroyed through January 1, 2000; and
(4) [a] person whose vessel made a documented harvest of crab species during the pe-
riod January 1, 1998 through February 7, 1998 and who obtains the fishing history of
a vessel that meets the GQP and the EQP, or enters into a contract to obtain the fish-





70. EMAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH MARK FINA, AUG. 29, 2002, supra note 55.
71. BERING SEA CRAB RATIONALIZATION PROGRAM ALTERNATIVES, supra note 6, at
38, 173.
72. Id. at 38, 173-74.
73. Id. at 173.
74. Id. at 175.
75. Note, however, that "[w]ith recent declines in various BSAI crab stocks... in-season
adjustments within the GHL range have not occurred." Id. at 174.
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emergency order.76 Unfortunately, "even with good in-season assess-
ment and real-time catch reporting, catches can change rapidly and a
large efficient fleet can quickly surpass a harvest target when [vessels]
locate high concentrations of crabs."77 For example, in 1996, the Bris-
tol Bay red king crab fishery GHL was five million pounds and in four
days, the harvest exceeded 8.4 million pounds-a sixty-eight percent
overage.18 In 1997, the GHL was seven million pounds, but 8.5 mil-
lion were taken in four days-a twenty-one percent overage.79
While these numbers show the ease with which the GHL can be
grossly exceeded, they also indicate that the season for many crab fish-
eries is extremely short. These short seasons raise safety and eco-
nomic concerns.8" With seasons only several days long and no limits
to the amount of crabs that a vessel can harvest, there is a race to catch
as many crabs as one can.81 This race, often referred to as a "fishing
derby," requires fisherman to harvest in dangerous weather or danger-
ous conditions, resulting in high levels of occupational loss of life and
injury.82 In addition, because the LLP guarantees only who will par-
ticipate in the derby and not a specific share of the GHL, there is little
economic stability for harvesters, processors, and coastal communi-
ties."
In considering the shortcomings of the LLP, one should recog-
nize that the program, like the VMP, was not intended to completely
resolve the problem of excess harvesting capacity. Rather, the LLP
was intended "to serve as an interim [or first] step toward a more
comprehensive solution to the conservation, management, and eco-
nomic problems in an open access fishery."84  NPFMC's proposed
three-pie voluntary cooperative program, discussed in the next Part,
represents the "second step"85 for BSAI fisheries, with the goal of "al-
76. Id. at 38.
77. Id. at 176. See also REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 6, at 5 ("[tlhe GHL is often
exceeded through no fault of the managers because in-season monitoring cannot keep pace with
harvests during the short seasons").
78. BERING SEA CRAB RATIONALIZATION PROGRAM ALTERNATIVES, supra note 6, at
176.
79. Id.
80. See SHARING THE FISH, supra note 19, at 33-36.
81. See EMAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH MARK FINA, AUG. 29, 2002, supra note 55.
82. See Arne Fuglvog, The Positive Benefits of the Halibut and Sablefish IFQ Program, Na-
tional Fisheries Conservation Center, http://www.nfcc-fisheries.com/irpov-c09.htm (last vis-
ited June 20, 2002); BERING SEA CRAB RATIONALIZATION PROGRAM ALTERNATIVES, supra
note 6, at 12.
83. See BERING SEA CRAB RATIONALIZATION PROGRAM ALTERNATIVES, supra note 6,
at 1, 12.
84. Id. at 4.
85. Seeid. at 3.
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leviat[ing] problems of resource conservation, bycatch and handling
mortality, excessive harvesting capacity, lack of economic stability,
and safety that have arisen under the race to fish."86
IV. NPFMC's THREE-PIE VOLUNTARY COOPERATIVE PROGRAM
As mentioned in the previous Part, one of the problems with the
License Limitation Program (LLP) is that an individual is permitted
to catch as many crabs as he can until the guideline harvest level
(GHL) is reached and the fishery is closed. Even with real-time re-
porting, the GHL can be grossly exceeded, contributing to the prob-
lem of stock decline. North Pacific Fishery Management Council's
(NPFMC) proposed three-pie voluntary cooperative program ad-
dresses this problem in two ways.87 First, it replaces the GHL with a
total allowable catch (TAC).88 The difference between a GHL and a
TAC is that a TAC sets a specific catch limit, whereas a GHL sets a
target catch range.89 According to NPFMC, "[t]his more precise
management of harvests should benefit stocks."9 Second, NPFMC's
proposal allocates a certain percentage of the TAC to each harvester.
This means that when a fisherman sets out to harvest crabs, rather
than attempting to harvest as many crabs as he can in a short period of
time, he will know beforehand how much he can harvest. This in-
creases each harvester's accountability and decreases the chance of
overharvests from the fishery.91 This Part of the Comment provides
an overview of how the three-pie voluntary cooperative program
would work and how the TAC allocations would be made. This
overview is only intended to highlight some of the more prominent
features of the three-pie voluntary cooperative program-the features
most likely to raise legal concerns, as discussed later in Part V.
86. Id. at i.
87. It is important to reemphasize that NPFMC's purpose in proposing the "three-pie vol-
untary cooperative" program is not solely to address the depleted state of the crab fisheries
caused, in part, by the insufficiencies of the LLP. In addition to such conservation goals,
"[r]ationalization will improve economic conditions substantially, for all sectors of the crab indus-
try." Letter from David Benton, Chairman, North Pacific Fishery Management Council, to
United States Congress, Aug. 5, 2002 (on file with author), and will "improve safety of partici-
pants in the fishery by ending the race for fish." REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 6, at 1.




92. This Comment will not discuss captains shares and the crew loan program, the provi-
sions for catcher/processors who participate in both the harvest and processing sectors, or the
data collection and review programs to assess the success of the rationalization program.
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A. Overview of NPFMC's Preferred Alternative
Under the three-pie voluntary cooperative program, all of the
TAC would be allocated each year through harvest shares.93 Each eli-
gible harvester would be allocated a long-term quota share (QS)-"a
revocable privilege that [would] allow the holder to receive an annual
allocation of a specific portion of the annual TAC from a fishery."94
(The annual allocation is referred to as an individual fishing quota
(IFQ)9 ) Ninety percent of a person's initial allocation would be as
Class A shares, while ten percent of a person's initial allocation would
be as Class B shares.96 Long-term processing quota shares (PQS),
enabling processors to receive annual individual processing quotas
(IPQ), would be issued for ninety percent of the TAC (corresponding
one-to-one to the Class A shares). Thus "in each fishery, there will be
jockeying among harvesters to marry their Class A IFQs with proces-
sors' IPQs."97 This means that a harvester could sell his Class A allo-
cation only to a processor who has not filled its quota. If a processor
has filled its quota, then the harvester would have to sell to a processor
who had not met its quota. The ten percent Class B shares would go
to all harvesters proportionally to their initial allocation. Thus, each
harvester would receive ninety percent of his allocation as Class A
shares and ten percent of his allocation as Class B shares. Since there
would be no harvester restrictions on Class B shares, the harvester
would be free to sell his Class B shares to whichever processor will
give him the best price.9"
Regional allocation would be accomplished by designating all
Class A harvest shares-the shares that have restrictions on their de-
livery-and all corresponding processing shares to one of two regions:
North-areas on the Bering Sea north of 560 20' north latitude, which
would include the Pribilof Islands and all other Bering Sea Islands ly-
ing to the north; and South-any area that is not North, including
Kodiak and other areas of the Gulf of Alaska.9 Class B harvest
93. REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 6, at 2.
94. Id. at 6.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 2, 6.
97. Email Correspondence from Mark Fina, Senior Economist, North Pacific Fishery
Management Council, to Avi Brisman (July 9, 2002, 13:18:16 ADT) (on file with author).
98. This helps "to balance negotiating leverage between the harvesting and processing sec-
tors." North Pacific Fishery Management Council, News and Notes 1, June 2002, at
http://www.fakr.noaa.gov/npfmc/Newsletters/0602news.pdf (last visited July 2, 2002).
99. REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 6, at 3. For "the Western Aleutian Islands (Adak)
golden king crab fishery, the designation is based on an east/west line to accommodate a differ-
ent distribution of activity in that fishery." Id. n.4. In addition, the Bering Sea C. bairdi fishery
would have no regional designation. The reason is that this "fishery is anticipated to be con-
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shares, however, would not be subject to regional landing require-
ments, and thus "[c]rab harvested with Class B shares could be landed
at any location under the program.""'
B. Eligibility
1. Harvesters
In order to receive a QS, and subsequently an IFQ the harvester
would have to currently hold a valid, permanent, fully transferable
LLP license.1"' Much the way that entry into the LLP was based on
an individual's past performance in the fishery, under the three-pie
voluntary cooperative program, QSs for a fishery would be based on
"the harvester's average annual portion of the total qualified catch
during a specific qualifying period.""1 2 For example, the QS for some-
one wishing to harvest Bristol Bay red king crabs would be based on
the relationship of his four best years of harvesting during the five-
year period of 1996-2000 in comparison to the total amount of Bristol
Bay red king crabs caught during that time."10
ducted primarily as an incidental catch fishery with the Bristol Bay red king crab and Bering Sea
C. opilio fisheries making any regional designation operationally difficult and potentially overly
restrictive." Id. at 19.
100. Id. at 18. In addition to the regionalization component, NPFMC is currently consid-
ering several different options intended to further protect communities. Id. at 19; North Pacific
Fishery Management Council, Council Actions for Item C-1 BSAI Crab Rationalization 4-5,
October 4, 2002, available at http://www.fakr.noaa.gov/npfmc/Motions/
council-craboct02_motion.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2002) [hereinafter CRAB
RATIONALIZATION MOTION OCTOBER 2002].
101. REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 6, at 6.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 6-7. The qualifying periods differ for each species because of closures and other
circumstances in the fisheries in recent years. Id. at 6. The qualifying period for determination
of the QS distribution of Bering Sea C. opilio (snow crab) is the best four out of five season from
1996-2000. The qualifying period for determination of the QS distribution of Bering Sea C.
bairdi (Tanner crab) is the best four out of six seasons from 1991/92-1996. The qualifying pe-
riod for determination of the QS distribution of WAI (Adak) golden king crab is all five seasons
from 1996/97-2000/01. The qualifying period for determination of the QS distribution of EAI
(Dutch Harbor) golden king crab is all five seasons from 1996/97-2000/01. The qualifying pe-
riod for determination of the QS distribution of WAI (Adak) red king crab-West of 179" West
is the best three out of four seasons from 1992/93-1995/96. The qualifying period for QS dis-
tribution of Pribilof blue and red king crab is the best four out of five seasons from 1994-98.
The qualifying period for QS distribution of St. Matthew blue king crab is the best four out of
five seasons from 1994-98. Id. at 7.
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2. Processors
Processors would be eligible to receive PQS if they are U.S. cor-
porations or partnerships °4 and if they processed crab during 1998 or
1999.105 If a processor did not process crab in 1998 or 1999, it would
be eligible to receive PQS under a "hardship provision" if it met the
following provisions: (a) if it processed opilio crab in each season be-
tween 1988-97; and (b) if it invested significant capital (direct invest-
ment in processing equipment and processing vessel improvements in
excess of $1 million) in the processing platform after 1995.106 The
purpose of these eligibility criteria is "to prevent reentry of processors
that have already elected to exit the fisheries."'0 7 In addition, alloca-
tion of PQS would be based on processing history during a specified
qualifying period for each fishery.' "A processor's allocation in a
fishery would equal its share of all qualified processing in the qualify-
ing period (i.e., pounds processed by the processor divided by pounds
processed by all qualified processors)."'0 9 The qualifying periods for
determining processor allocation would vary by fishery."0 Each fish-
ery has a different period to compensate for variations in the fishery's
management, such as closures. "The most recent seasons were ex-
cluded in part to limit the effectiveness of efforts by participants to
obtain a larger allocation by increasing participation in recent seasons
when it was apparent that allocations would be based on historic har-
vest levels.""'
104. BERING SEA CRAB RATIONALIZATION PROGRAM ALTERNATIVES, supra note 6, at
257.
105. REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 6, at 12.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. As with the qualifying periods for determining allocations in the harvester sector,
qualifying periods in the processing sector "were selected to balance historical participation and
recent participation." Id. at 6.
109. Id.
110. For Bristol Bay red king crab (BBRKC), the qualifying years would be from 1997-99;
for Bering Sea C. opilio (snow crab), the qualifying years would be from 1997-99; for Bering Sea
C. bairdi (Tanner crab), allocation would be based fifty percent on the allocation for BBRKC and
50% on allocation for Bering Sea C. opilio; for WAI (Adak) golden king crab, the qualifying years
would be from 1996/97-1999/00; for EAI (Dutch Harbor) golden king crab, the qualifying
years would be 1996/97-1999/00; for Adak (WAI) red king crab-West of 179 ° W, allocation
would be based on allocation for WAI (Adak) golden king crab; for Pribilof blue and red crab,
the qualifying years would be from 1996-98; and for St. Matthew blue king crab, the qualifying
years would be from 1996-98. Id.
111. Id. at6.
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C. Other Provisions
1. Binding Arbitration
The success of the three-pie voluntary cooperative program
hinges on fair price negotiations between harvesters and processors.
In light of the fact that the "BSAI crab fisheries have a history of con-
tentious price negotiations," ' where harvester strikes have settled the
prices, 113 the Council included in its three-pie voluntary cooperative
program a provision for binding arbitration for the settlement of price
disputes between Class A harvest shareholders and processor share-
holders.14
2. Cooperatives
Under the three-pie voluntary cooperative program, harvesters
would be permitted to form voluntary cooperatives associated with
one or more processors holding processor quota shares."' The pur-
pose of a cooperative would be "to facilitate efficiency in the harvest
sector by aiding harvesters in coordinating harvest activities among
members and deliveries to processors.""' 6 To illustrate how this might
work, imagine that Harvester A has an IFQ of Bering Sea C. opilio
(snow crabs) and an IFQ of Bering Sea C. bairdi (Tanner crabs); Har-
vester B has an IFQ of Bering Sea C. opilio (snow crabs), an IFQ of
Bering Sea C. bairdi (Tanner crabs), and an IFQ of EAI (Dutch Har-
bor) golden king crabs; Harvester C, an IFQ of Bering Sea C. opilio
(snow crabs), an IFQ of Bering Sea C. bairdi (Tanner crabs), and an
IFQ of EAI (Dutch Harbor) golden king crabs; and Harvester D an
IFQ of Bering Sea C. opilio (snow crabs) and an IFQ of WAI (Adak)
golden king crabs.
112. Id. at 17.
113. Id. at 2.
114. Id. at 17. The reason that the binding arbitration provision applies only to disputes
between holders of Class A shares and holders of processor shares is that these are the shares for
which markets are limited. Id. Since Congressional authorization of a binding arbitration pro-
gram would be needed before such a program could be included in the rationalization program,
the Council is still considering different binding final-offer arbitration program structures.
BERING SEA CRAB RATIONALIZATION PROGRAM ALTERNATIVES, supra note 6, at 346. The
Council is still considering different binding final-offer arbitration program structures. For a
discussion of potential scope of the arbitration, basis for price determination, and enforcement of
the binding arbitration decision, see id. at 347.
115. REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 6, at 16. At a minimum, there would need to be
four unique harvesters holding QS for cooperative formation. Id.
116. Id. Cooperatives also help ensure that a larger percentage of the TAC is harvested.
See Id.
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If the four harvesters wish to form a cooperative, they would first
file a cooperative agreement with the Secretary of Commerce, follow-
ing Council review." 7 Once the filing is made, the cooperative as a
whole receives its members' aggregate annual allocation in each of the
applicable crab fisheries."' The cooperative could then decide, for ex-
ample, that Harvester A would harvest all of the cooperative's IFQ in
the Bering Sea C. opilio (snow crab) fishery.
The co-op members who would have their Bering Sea C. opilio
(snow crab) allocations fished by Harvester A would receive a royalty
(for their allocations) and Harvester A would receive compensation for
doing the fishing. Or, all four harvesters could harvest individually
and then "consolidate small portions of their allocations on a single
vessel when a small portion of each vessel's allocation is remaining." '119
This would "reduce queuing of harvesters waiting to offload their har-
vests, [thereby further] reducing deadloss of harvested crab."' 2 °
Essentially, cooperatives would have a good deal of flexibility to
set up the type of cooperative agreements that would work best for its
members. Cooperative members would be free to leave a cooperative
at any time after one season and would retain their individual QS and
associated IFQ allocations, which they could then bring to other coop-
121eratives.
3. Transferability of QS/IFQs and PQS/IPQs
QS/IFQs would be transferable under the three-pie voluntary
cooperative program, "subject to limits on the amount of shares a per-
son may own or use. ' 122 In addition, the person seeking the QS/IFQ
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 16.
120. Id. Processors would benefit from cooperatives because, if harvesters are coordinating
their deliveries, "processing crews and equipment have less down time between deliveries." Id.
121. Id. at 16-17.
122. REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 6, at 9. The options for capping the ownership of
QS would most likely vary between the fisheries. BERING SEA CRAB RATIONALIZATION
PROGRAM ALTERNATIVES, supra note 6, at 240. NPFMC is currently considering several op-
tions for capping the ownership of QS. For the Bristol Bay red king crab, C. opilio, C. bairdi,
Pribilof red and blue king crab and St. Matthew blue king crab fisheries, NPFMC is considering
the following options: 1.0% of the total QS pool for Bristol Bay red king crab; 1.0% of total QS
pool for C. opilio crab; 1.0% of the total QS pool for C. bairdi crab; 2.0% of the total QS pool for
Pribilof red and blue king crab; and 2.0% of the total QS pool for St. Matthew blue king crab.
For the Dutch Harbor (EAI) brown king crab, western Aleutian Island (Adak) brown king crab,
and WAI (Adak) red king crab west of 1790 West longitude, the percentage-cap would be 10%.
North Pacific Fishery Management Council, DRAFT Council Motion for Item C-5 BSAI Crab
Rationalization 5 (June 10, 2002), http://www.fakr.noaa.gov/npfmc/Committees/Crab
/CouncilCrabMotion602.pdf (last visited July 3, 2002) [hereinafter DRAFT COUNCIL
MOTION]. Note that a person holding and using 1% of the total IFQ for the Bering Sea C. opilio
2003]
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would need to meet certain eligibility requirements. NPFMC is cur-
rently considering a number of different eligibility options to receive
QS/IFQs by transfer.123 The Council is also considering prohibiting
the transfer of QS/IFQs after the first five years of the program, ex-
cept within cooperatives. 124 Because cooperatives make fisheries more
efficient, limiting transfer by persons not in cooperatives encourages
cooperative membership. The rationale behind the five-year period in
which leasing is not constrained is "to allow a period of adjustment
during which harvesters can coordinate fishing activities and build re-
lationships necessary for cooperative membership. "121
PQS/IPQs would also be transferable under NPFMC's three-pie
voluntary cooperative program, subject to ownership caps. 26  The
Council has established three provisions governing the transfer of
processor shares. First, "[p]rocessing quota shares and IPQs would be
freely transferable, including leasing." 27 "Second, IPQs could be used
by any facility of the Eligible Processor (without transferring or leas-
ing).' 2' This means that if an eligible processor owned several proc-
essing facilities, it would be free to use its IPQs at any of its facilities,
fishery, for example, could team with someone else also holding 1% of the total IFQ for the Ber-
ing Sea C. opilio fishery and fish up to 2% from a single vessel. "The caps on harvesters are lower
than those on processors mainly because harvesting has had more participants historically."
Email Correspondence from Mark Fina, Senior Economist, North Pacific Fishery Management
Council, to Avi Brisman (Nov. 11, 2002, 9:32:13 ADT) (on file with author). For an analysis of
the purpose of ownership caps and the factors the Council would consider in assessing the per-
centage-caps, see BERING SEA CRAB RATIONALIZATION PROGRAM ALTERNATIVES, supra
note 6, at 238-42.
123. Under one option, all U.S. citizens who have had at least 150 days of sea time would
be eligible to receive QS/IFQs by transfer. Under a second option, "[e]ntities that have a U.S.
citizen with 20% or more ownership and at least ... 150 days of sea time," would be eligible to
receive QS/IFQs by transfer. DRAFT COUNCIL MOTION, supra note 122, at 4.
124. REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 6, at 9.
125. Id.
126. NPFMC has proposed a cap of thirty percent of the outstanding PQS in each fishery.
Id. at 15. Thus, for example, a processor cannot own more than thirty percent of the PQS in the
St. Matthew Blue King Crab fishery. As with the other fisheries in the proposal, but with the
exception of the Bering Sea C. opilio (snow crab) fishery, there is no regional limit for the St.
Matthew Blue King Crab fishery. Thus conceivably, a processor owning thirty percent of the
PQS for the entire St. Matthew Blue King Crab fishery-all of which were in the South Re-
gion-could wind up controlling the entire South Region market if the rest of the PQS for the St.
Matthew Blue King Crab fishery were allocated to processors in the North Region. In Bering
Sea C. opilio (snow crab) fishery, the thirty percent cap still applies, but there is also a regional
cap. A processor cannot own more than thirty percent of the PQS for the entire Bering Sea C.
opilio (snow crab) fishery, but it also cannot control more than sixty percent of the market of the
Bering Sea C. opilio (snow crab) fishery. See id. In other words, it may not use all thirty percent
of its PQS cap in the North Region if to do so would enable it to control more than sixty percent
of the market.
127. BERING SEA CRAB RATIONALIZATION PROGRAM ALTERNATIVES, supra note 6, at
260.
128. Id.
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without this constituting a transfer or lease. If, however, its IPQs
were categorized for one region, it could not use them at one of its fa-
cilities in another region. Similarly, PQS and IPQs "categorized for
one region [could not] be transferred to a processor for use in a differ-
ent region.,
129
The rationale behind the transferability of QS/IFQs and
PQS/IPQs is that it allows for a number of economic benefits. First,
allowing the transferability of quota shares would enable "some par-
ticipants to leave the industry with a compensation financed by the
industry itself, that is, to be bought out by the other industry partici-
pants."' 3 Second, the transferability of quota shares would ensure
that both QS/IFQs and PQS/IPQs "are held by those who are willing
to pay the highest price for them."' 3' This would promote "efficiency
in the industry because those who [would be] willing to pay the high-
est price for quotas would normally be those who expect to utilize
them most profitably, either by doing so at a lower cost than others or
by transforming the [crabs] into a more valuable product.
' 32
To further understand how transferable quotas would promote
economic efficiency, consider that in the short run "transferability
leads to lower operating costs and a higher production value in fisher-
ies plagued by harvesting overcapacity. ' 13  With respect to harvest-
ers, "[t]hose who [could] fish at the lowest cost or produce the most
valuable product [would be] able to buy or lease fishing quotas at a
price that is acceptable to both buyer and seller.""'13 The same would
be true for processors and processor quotas-those who could process
at the lowest cost or produce the most valuable product would be able
to lease PQS or purchase IPQs at a price that is acceptable to both
buyer and seller.
In the long run, transferability of quotas would promote eco-
nomic efficiency because it would result in optimally sized fishing
fleets:
129. Id.
130. SHARING THE FISH, supra note 19, at 168. Note that in writing SHARING THE FISH,
the National Research Council discussed only the economic aspects of transferability of IFQs,
not PQS/IPQs. However, the economic aspects of transferability of IFQs are applicable to
PQS/IPQs.
131. Id.
132. Id. In theory, processors with market power in the downstream market could also af-
ford to pay higher prices for other processors' quotas. Because of the caps on the percentage of
processor quota shares that a processor can own in a given fishery, however, processors will not
gain any market power from this system. If they have any market power in downstream markets
from other sources, this would enable them to pay more. The three-pie voluntary cooperative
program, however, does not seem to be creating or adding to that downstream power.
133. Id. at 169.
134. Id.
2003]
Seattle University Law Review
A person or firm with a given quota [would] have no economic
incentive to invest in more or larger fishing vessels than needed
to take this quota. Alternatively, if there are economies of scale
in fishing for the target species, those who wish to invest in ves-
sels of an optimal size but have insufficient quota to utilize the
vessels fully [would] be able to buy additional quota for this
purpose. 135
The same would be true for processors. A processor with a given
quota would have no economic incentive to invest in more processing
equipment than needed to handle its quota. A processor wishing to
expand its operations or upgrade its equipment to improve its capacity
to process fish could buy additional quotas if its current allocation was
insufficient. In this way, transferability serves a third purpose-it
helps "to mitigate imbalances that may occur in the initial alloca-
tion. ' 36 While the initial allocation is intended to reward past per-
formance, it should also reflect capacity to fish and process because
presumably harvesters with larger vessels and processors with more
equipment and larger operations should have harvested and processed
more crabs during the qualifying periods. Where the initial allocation
does not reflect capacity (such as a harvester who had an off-year due
to illness or injury), transferability of quota shares would allow the
harvester or processor to acquire the desired number of additional
shares.
V. LEGAL ISSUES CONCERNING PROCESSOR QUOTAS
Congress has never grappled with the issue of whether to allow
the use of processor quotas. As a result, and under the Magnuson Act
as it currently stands, the law does not authorize individual processing
quotas (IPQs).37 The Magnuson Act does not contain any provisions
explicitly allowing any Regional Council to submit to the Secretary
any fishery management plan, plan amendment, or regulation that
creates an individual processor quota program. Furthermore, the na-
tional standards espoused in section 301 imply that individual proces-
sor quotas are impermissible. Under section 301(a)(5),
"[c]onservation and management measures shall, where practicable,
consider efficiency in the utilization of fishery resources; except that
135. Id.
136. Id. at 168.
137. Email Correspondence from Mark Fina, Senior Economist, North Pacific Fishery
Management Council, to Avi Brisman (July 1, 2002, 9:42:38 a.m. ADT) (on file with author)
[hereinafter EMAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH MARK FINA, July 1, 2002].
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no such measure shall have economic allocation as its sole purpose." '138
Since processor quotas are unrelated to fisheries management or re-
source conservation, 139 it would be hard to argue that processor quotas
serve a non-economic purpose.14 ° There does not seem to be any rea-
son to believe that IPQs are per se invalid;' however, Congress is free
138. 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(5) (1996) (emphasis added). Not everyone subscribes to the belief
that processor quotas are implicitly unauthorized by law. Under § 303(b)(6)(A), any Council, in
preparing a fishery management plan, may establish "a limited access system for the fishery in
order to achieve optimum yield if, in developing such system, the Council and the Secretary take
into account present participation in the fishery." 16 U.S.C. § 1853(b)(6)(A) (2002). According
to Joseph T. Plesha and Christopher C. Riley, "[i]t is clear that this provision would require that
the impact of any ITQ allocation on the processing sector also be considered before initial alloca-
tions are made. Congress would otherwise have stated that establishment of a limited access sys-
tem need only consider participation by 'fishing vessels' in the fishery, or some other more nar-
rowly drawn requirement." Joseph T. Plesha & Christopher C. Riley, The Allocation of
Individual Transferable Quotas to Investors in the Seafood Industry of the North Pacific 7 (1991) (on
file with author). Plesha and Riley's argument hinges on the legality of ITQs; they do not argue
that the Magnuson Act requires or even permits processor quotas in the absence of ITQs (most
likely because their article predates the 1996 moratorium). Essentially, Plesha and Riley believe
that because the language of § 303(b)(6)(A) is broad, i.e., it is not restricted to "fishing vessels,"
then under § 303(b)(6)(A), any IFQ program must also consider the processing sector. This
should not mean, however, and Plesha and Riley do not contend, that § 303(b)(6)(A) authorizes
IPQ programs. All that Plesha and Riley argue is that the language of the statute requires proc-
essors to be considered. There may be other ways to consider processors without creating an
IPQ program per se. For example, a well-structured, well-run IFQ program would consider
processors because by lengthening the seasons for harvesting and reducing the race for fish, there
would be more economic stability in the processor sector (albeit not as much as if there were
processor quotas).
139. See AMCC LIMITED ACCESS, supra note 17. This is not to say that fish processors
do not play an integral part in the fishing industry. On the contrary, "[w]ithout processing,
much of the fish being brought ashore would never make it to market and thus be useless to
catch." SHARING THE FISH, supra note 19, at 152.
140. The issue of whether individual processor quotas are permissible under § 301 really
boils down to how one interprets "economic allocation" and views the purpose of the program.
This Comment considers "economic allocation" to be the sole purpose of the program because
the program is intended to benefit the processors and communities in economic ways. NPFMC
argues, on the other hand, that "economic allocation" is not the sole purpose of the program.
While one of the purposes is to help bring economic stability to the processor sector, NPFMC
contends that the program has a social purpose-benefiting the shoreline communities. See
Email from Mark Fina, Senior Economist, North Pacific Fishery Management Council, to Avi
Brisman (Feb. 17, 2003, 16:22:24 ADT) (on file with author). If one believes, as this Comment
contends, that providing economic stability to the shoreline communities is an "economic alloca-
tion," then individual processor quotas are impermissible under § 301. If one believes, as
NPFMC contends, that providing economic stability to the shorelines communities is a social
benefit separate from the "economic allocation" to processors, then individual processor quotas
do not violate § 301.
141. On the contrary, in the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2001, Congress requested
that NPFMC analyze various rationalization alternatives including IFQs and IPQs:
The North Pacific Fishery Management Council shall examine the fisheries under its
jurisdiction, particularly the Gulf of Alaska groundfish and Bering Sea crab fisheries,
to determine whether rationalization is needed. In particular, the North Pacific
Council shall analyze individual quotas, processor quotas, cooperatives, and quotas
held by communities.
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to include a provision authorizing the use of processor quotas during
the upcoming reauthorization of the Magnuson Act. Nevertheless, if
Congress were to take such a step in developing an IPQ program, Re-
gional Councils should be aware of a number of legal concerns.
This Part analyzes possible challenges to both processor quota
systems in general and North Pacific Fishery Management System's
(NPFMC) three-pie voluntary cooperative program based on viola-
tions of equal protection, "takings" claims, and violations of antitrust
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2001, supra note 29. Although this is not an authorization
of IPQs, it suggests that at some level, Congress believes that IPQs are legal.
In addition, there is the American Fisheries Act, which "is the closest Congress has come to au-
thorizing processor shares." EMAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH MARK FINA, July 1, 2002, supra
note 137. Pursuant to § 210(b) of the American Fisheries Act:
(1) Catcher vessel cooperatives.-Effective January 1, 2000, upon the filling of a con-
tract implementing a fishery cooperative under subsection (a) which-
(A) is signed by the owners of 80 percent or more of the qualified catcher vessels that
delivered pollock for processing by a shoreside processor in the directed pollock fish-
ery in the year prior to the year in which the fishery cooperative will be in effect; and
(B) specifies, except as provided in paragraph (6), that such catcher vessels will deliver
pollock in the directed pollock fishery only to such shoreside processor during the
year in which the fishery cooperative will be in effect and that such shoreside proces-
sor has agreed to process such pollock, the Secretary shall allow only such catcher ves-
sels (and catcher vessels whose owners voluntarily participate pursuant to paragraph
(2)) to harvest the aggregate percentage of the directed fishing allowance under section
206(b)(1) in the year in which the fishery cooperative will be in effect that is equiva-
lent to the aggregate total amount of pollock harvested by such catcher vessels (and by
such catcher vessels whose owners voluntarily participate pursuant to paragraph (2))
in the directed pollock fishery for processing by the inshore component during 1995,
1996, and 1997 relative to the aggregate total amount of pollock harvested in the di-
rected pollock fishery for processing by the inshore component during such years and
shall prevent such catcher vessels (and catcher vessels whose owners voluntarily par-
ticipate pursuant to paragraph (2)) from harvesting in aggregate in excess of such di-
rected fishing allowance.
American Fisheries Act, Pub. L. 107-20 (codified as 16 U.S.C. § 1851(2001)). Pursuant to §
210(b)(6):
Transfer of cooperative harvest.-A contract implementing a fishery cooperative un-
der paragraph (1) may, notwithstanding the other provisions of this subsection, pro-
vide for up to 10 percent of the pollock harvested under cooperative to be processed
by a shoreside processor eligible under section 208(f) other than the shoreside proces-
sor to which pollock will be delivered under paragraph (1).
Id. According to Mark Fina, § 210(b)(1), which requires delivery of a cooperative's harvest to
the associated processor, and § 210(b)(6), which permits up to ten percent of a cooperatives de-
liveries to be delivered to other processors, "these two provisions taken together effectively re-
quire 90 percent of deliveries to the associated processor." Email Correspondence from Mark
Fina, Senior Economist, North Pacific Fishery Management Council, to Avi Brisman (July 26,
2002, 9:08:04 a.m. ADT) (on file with author). Fina, however, notes that the provisions under
the American Fisheries Act are different from an IPQ program: "Harvesters can move from co-
op to co-op[,] but must go through an open access fishery (with no guaranteed allocation) for one
year to move. This is different from a processor share program in that a processor has no privi-
lege to a share of the landings (i.e., the fishers can move without processor consent)." EMAIL
CORRESPONDENCE WITH MARK FINA, July 1, 2002, supra note 137.
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law. 42 This Part also examines two specific provisions of NPFMC's
three-pie voluntary cooperative program that may be legally problem-
atic-binding arbitration and regionalization.
A. Equal Protection Concerns
Under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, "[n]o
State shall make or enforce any law which shall.., deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." ' Although
there is no corresponding provision applicable to the federal govern-
ment, it is well settled that the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause,
"applicable to the federal government and thus to the regional councils
and the Secretary of Commerce, incorporates equal protection princi-
ples identical to those applied to the states."'44 Since a limited access
142. It is unlikely that an IPQ program would fail to withstand a constitutional challenge
on the basis of substantive due process. According to Christopher L. Koch, who discusses lim-
ited entry programs in general:
[i]t is most unlikely that limited entry would be found constitutionally infirm on the
basis of substantive due process, and Corsa v. Tawes gives great credence to this per-
ception.... Although the outcome of any judicial challenge will depend upon the
facts surrounding a particular limited entry scheme, unless the details of a specific
plan bear no rational relationship to the government's legitimate objectives, substan-
tive due process should not be an obstacle to implementing limited entry.
Christopher L. Koch, A Constitutional Analysis of Limited Entry, in LIMITED ENTRY AS A
FISHERY MANAGEMENT TOOL 256 (R. Bruce Rettig & Jay C. Ginter, eds., 1978). In Corsa,
the Court upheld a Maryland statute that prohibited the use of purse nets in the menhaden fish-
ery, rejecting the claim by commercial fishermen that the law effectively abolished the commer-
cial menhaden industry in Maryland (because purse nets were the only economically efficient
means of harvesting menhaden), thereby depriving them of liberty and property without due
process of law. See 149 F. Supp. 771, 777 (D. Md. 1957), affd 357 U.S. 37 (1957). The Court
found that the state had a legitimate objective-to protect the recreational fisheries that de-
pended upon menhaden-and that the means chosen were rationally related to that objective. Id.
at 776.
According to Koch, a limited entry system would also withstand challenges claiming violations
of procedural due process:
Procedural due process requires that when an individual's life, liberty, or property is
significantly affected by governmental action, there must be adequate notice of the ac-
tion and an opportunity, at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner, for some
type of hearing appropriate to the nature of the case .... [Whereas] the application of
an objective set of facts should not require a hearing (e.g., vessel size, vessel capacity,
years in the fishery), . . . a determination of whether an applicant meets more subjec-
tive criteria (e.g., dependence on the fishery, or potential social dislocation) is more
likely to generate such a requirement.
Koch, supra note 142, at 257, 258. Since the limited entry program proposed by NPFMC would
be based on "an objective set of facts," see Part IV.B supra, it is unlikely that a court would find
it necessary for the Council to hold hearings for each fisherman and processor applying for a
quota share. However, NPFMC must still provide adequate prior notice of the access limitation.
Id. at 259.
143. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
144. Koch, supra note 142, at 260 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976)). See also
Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
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system, such as a quota program, requires the classification of indi-
viduals into those permitted and those not permitted to process crabs,
the equal protection question raised by this classification process is
whether the method by which access to the fishery is allocated treats
similarly situated persons alike. 4 '
There are essentially three different standards of review that
courts will employ when confronted with challenges of equal protec-
tion violations. Governmental classifications are subjected to strict
scrutiny if "fundamental rights"'46 or "suspect classifications," such as
race 147 or national origin 4 ' (and sometimes alienage) 149 are involved.
Under the strict scrutiny standard, the government has the burden of
proving that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling in-
terest.' When this standard is applied, the law in question is gener-
ally found to violate equal protection requirements.'
51
Courts will employ an intermediate level of scrutiny in the equal
protection analysis of discrimination based on marital status,'5 2 and
gender.' Under the intermediate scrutiny standard, classifications
145. See, e.g., Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (ex-
plaining that the Equal Protection Clause "is essentially a direction that all persons similarly
situated should be treated alike").
146. If a law discriminates in the right to engage in a protected constitutional activity, such
as First Amendment rights, strict scrutiny will apply. Likewise, if a law discriminates in the ex-
ercise of implied rights, a stricter mode of judicial review will also be applied. See, e.g., Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to travel); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965) (right to privacy); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-85 (1978) (right to marry);
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966) (right to vote); Skinner v. Okla-
homa ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1965) (right to procreate).
147. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
148. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
149. Generally, if a state awards public benefits to citizens, but denies them to aliens, such
classification is "inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny." Graham v. Richard-
son, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971). For example, statutes barring aliens from competitive civil ser-
vice positions, Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 642 (1973), and from eligibility for member-
ship in the state bar, In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973), have been invalidated under the strict
scrutiny standard. But under the "political function" exception, if aliens are excluded from posi-
tions "that are intimately related to the process of democratic self-government," Bernal v.
Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 220 (1984), only the rational basis test is required. See Foley v. Connelie,
435 U.S. 291, 297 (1978) (upholding a state statute requiring that police officers be citizens since
police officers "are clothed with authority to exercise an almost infinite variety of discretionary
powers" involving the public); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979) (upholding a state stat-
ute requiring teachers to be citizens); Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982) (finding that
probation officers, like police officers and school teachers, exercise official discretion over indi-
viduals and qualified for the "political function" exception).
150. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984).
151. But see Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding the exclusion of
Japanese-Americans from certain areas on the West Coast during World War II on the grounds
of extreme military danger from sabotage).
152. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
153. See generally Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
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"must serve important governmental objectives and must be substan-
tially related to achievement of those objectives.""'
Finally, courts will employ a rational basis test in most other cir-
cumstances (those not involving race, national origin, alienage, marital
status, gender, etc.). This test asks "whether the classification is rea-
sonable, possesses some rational connection to the measure's legiti-
mate purpose and treats all within the class alike."'55 Under this test,
"legislation is presumed to be reasonable (i.e., the challenger has the
burden of proof), and any reasonably conceivable facts justifying the
classification will be accepted.'
' 56
Of these three standards, a court would most likely apply the ra-
tional basis test in analyzing an IPQ program that "allocate[s] permits
on the basis of commonly mentioned standards, such as length of ex-
perience or extent of investment in a particular fishery, the degree of
dependence on a fishery,... or the ability to engage in other fisher-
ies."' 7 First, classifications based on processing history are a far cry
from the type of classifications that the Supreme Court has previously
held to be suspect. Second, "the right to pursue a particular vocation
has never been held a 'fundamental right.""58  And third, the "Su-
preme Court has shown no inclination in recent years to expand the
existing list of suspect classifications or fundamental rights."'5 9
In applying the rational basis test to NPFMC's three-pie volun-
tary cooperative program, a court would first look at the purpose of
the IPQ program.1 6' A court would probably consider both the broad
purpose of crab rationalization as a whole-resource conservation,
economic stabilization, safety issues, etc.'16'-as well as the specific in-
clusion of IPQs-"to protect processor investment in the fisheries and
balance the bargaining power of processors with harvesters receiving
harvest shares."' 62 A court would then look at the system by which
processing quota shares and individual processing quotas (PQS/IPQ)
are allocated (i.e., processing history during a specified qualifying pe-
154. Boren, 429 U.S. at 198.
155. Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm. v. Apokedak, 606 P.2d 1255, 1262 (Alaska 1980)
(internal citations omitted).
156. Id.
157. Koch supra note 142, at 260.
158. Id. (citing Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957) (stating that
qualifications for admittance to the practice of law need have only a 'rational connection' with the
applicant's fitness to practice)).
159. Id.
160. Seesupra Part IV.
161. See BERING SEA CRAB RATIONALIZATION PROGRAM ALTERNATIVES, supra note
6, at 1.
162. REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 6, at 12.
2003]
Seattle University Law Review
riod). Next, the court would weigh the process by which PQS/IPQs
are allocated with the intended purpose of the IPQ program to deter-
mine whether the classification (i.e., those who are granted PQS/IPQs
and those who are not) is reasonable.
As mentioned above, under the rational basis test, laws will gen-
erally be upheld if they are rationally related to a legitimate interest. It
is difficult to fail this test and most governmental action examined un-
der this standard is upheld unless it is arbitrary or irrational. Courts
will usually defer to the legislature's decision that a law is rational.
Loose fitting laws (i.e., laws that are not in every respect "logically
consistent" with their aims) are usually held to be constitutional.163
Furthermore, the law in question need not be the best law that could
have been written to achieve the legislative goal, nor must the law go
very far towards achieving the legislative goal. As long as the law is
headed down the path towards the legitimate goal, it will be upheld,
even if the Court thinks that the law is ill-advised.'64 Thus it seems
safe to assume that "as long as a classification of [processors] is ration-
ally related to the statutory purposes of limited entry, and treats all




The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution states: "nor shall pri-
vate property be taken for public use, without just compensation. "166
While this may seem simple enough, interpretation of the takings
clause has had a long and storied history. "Courts have had little suc-
cess in devising any set formula for determining when government
regulation of private property amounts to a regulatory taking.' ' 167 In
the most recent chapter of the takings chronicle, Tahoe-Sierra Preser-
vation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,16 the Supreme
Court addressed the question of whether a "moratorium on develop-
ment imposed during the process of devising a comprehensive land-
use plan constitutes a per se taking of property requiring compensation
163. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955).
164. See Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106,109 (1949).
165. Koch, supra note 142, at 260.
166. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment applies to
both the Federal Government and the States. See Chicago, B & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S.
226, 239, 241, (1897); Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980).
167. Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 216
F.3d 764, 771 (9th Cir. 2000) [hereinafter TSPC IV].
168. 535 U.S. 302 (2002) [hereinafter Tahoe-Sierra].
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under the Takings Clause."' 69 The Supreme Court applied the bal-
ancing test of Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City 7 ' to
determine whether compensation was required for land use regulations
designed temporarily to freeze all property development, rather than a
per se rule similar to the one announced in the more recent decision,
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.1
7 1
Unlike the per se rule announced in Lucas, which evaluates
whether the plaintiff in a takings case has been denied "all economi-
cally beneficial or productive use of land,"' 72 the test set forth in Penn
Central requires courts to balance the following: (1) the economic im-
pact of the regulation on the claimant; (2) the extent to which the
regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expecta-
tions; and (3) the character of the governmental action.'73
Based on the analysis in Tahoe-Sierra, it appears the courts
would apply the Penn Central balancing test, rather than a Lucas-like
categorical rule, to determine whether an IPQ program constitutes a
regulatory taking. As these three cases demonstrate, however, the tak-
ings law is in flux and courts could opt not to apply Penn Central to an
IPQ program, since it is not a land-use regulation. Nevertheless, as-
suming that courts would apply the balancing test of Penn Central (be-
cause that was the test applied in the most recent takings law case-
Tahoe Sierra), let us turn to the takings issues confronting an IPQ
program.
There are essentially two takings issues with respect to
NPFMC's three-pie voluntary cooperative program. First, would the
IPQ system constitute a taking from the perspective of processors who
would be foreclosed from entry into the market based on the initial al-
location of PQS established by the Regional Council? Second, would
169. Id. at 306.
170. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
171. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
172. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
173. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. Under the rule proposed by the petitioners in Tahoe-
Sierra, which the Court rejected,
there is no need to evaluate the landowners' investment-backed expectations, the ac-
tual impact of the regulation on any individual, the importance of the public interest
served by the regulation, or the reasons for imposing the temporary restriction. For
petitioners, it is enough that a regulation imposes a temporary deprivation-no matter
how brief-of all economically viable use to trigger a per se rule that a taking has oc-
curred.
Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 320-21. In rejecting the petitioners' Lucas-like categorical rule, the
Court explained the rule in Lucas was limited to "the extraordinary circumstances when no pro-
ductive or economically beneficial use of land is permitted." Id. at 330 (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S.
at 1017 (emphasis in original)).
The Court in Tahoe-Sierra also stressed that the question of whether there is a taking depends on
the "particular circumstances of the case." Id. at 321.
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the IPQ system constitute a taking from the perspective of fishermen
who may be limited in where or to whom they can sell their fish? Al-
though the IPQ element of NPFMC's three-pie voluntary cooperative
program will undoubtedly have adverse economic effects on both the
processors who are excluded from the market and the fishermen who
cannot sell to the processors who have reached their quotas, it is
unlikely that a court would find a constitutional requirement for com-
pensating either group of individuals.
1. Excluded Processors
Processors who are not given a PQS under the system described
earlier might challenge the IPQ program on the following grounds: (a)
they have a property right in the "right to process crabs;" or (b) that
by their exclusion from the fishery, their equipment or other capital
investment has been taken.'74
It is unlikely that processors would succeed in convincing a court
that they have a property right in the right to process crabs and that
their exclusion from the fishery constitutes a taking. Since courts have
never found there to be a property right in a job, 7 ' processors trying
to assert a property right in the right to process crabs would have to
argue a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, "[n]o person
shall be... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law."' 76
According to Christopher L. Koch, in his article, A Constitutional
Analysis of Limited Entry, "[t]he concept of 'liberty' in the due process
clause was found to grant every citizen 'the right to live and work
where (one) will,' 'to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling,' and 'to
pursue any livelihood or avocation."" 77 Conceivably, excluded proc-
essors (as well as excluded harvesters) could argue that they have a
right of access to certain fisheries that cannot be "withdrawn or sig-
nificantly impaired by legislative action, which would preclude appli-
cation of limited entry programs." '178 Supreme Court jurisprudence
indicates, however, that substantive due process challenges to gov-
ernmental restraints on the right to engage in a particular occupation
174. See Koch, supra note 142, at 265.
175. See Local 1330, United Steel Workers of America v. United States Steel Corp., 631
F.2d 1264, 1266 (6th Cir. 1980), Koch notes: "a property right in the right to fish is groundless
as an abstract proposition." Koch, supra note 142, at 265. Extending this logic, a processor's
claim that he has a property right in the "right to process crabs" would also be groundless.
176. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
177. Koch, supra note 142, at 254 (citing Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897)).
178. Id.
[Vol. 26:929
A Less Tragic Commons
will be unsuccessful. 79  Thus, it seems apparent that a court con-
fronted with a processor's assertion of a property right in the right to
process crabs would neither take the step of subjecting the claim to the
regulatory takings test of Penn Central, nor would it find favorably for
the processor from a substantive due process perspective.
A court might, however, evaluate a processor's claim that its ex-
clusion from the fishery constituted a regulatory taking of its equip-
ment or other capital investment under the Penn Central balancing
test. A processor who was not given an allocation of PQS would argue
that this exclusion would have a severe economic impact. In response,
a court would likely point out that the processor could easily gain ac-
cess to the fishery by leasing PQS/purchasing IPQs. Although a
processor might argue that leasing PQS/purchasing IPQs would be
more expensive than being given a PQS allocation to begin with, a
court would probably point out that by acquiring a PQ/IPQ the
processor would be guaranteed income from processing, whereas no
such guarantee would have existed in a competitive fishery (such as in
the current License Limitation Program).
180
With respect to the second prong of the Penn Central test, a
processor would probably argue that the IPQ program and its subse-
quent exclusion from the fishery interfered with its "distinct invest-
ment-backed expectations." The processor would likely contend that
it was deprived of its return on investment because it had invested
thousands of dollars in processing equipment, which it was now un-
able to use. In response, a court might (a) reemphasize that the proc-
essor was free to enter the fishery by leasing PQS/purchasing IPQs;
(b) point out that the processor would be free to sell or lease its
equipment to processors who are already in the industry;18' or (c) sug-
gest that the processor use its equipment and machinery in another
fishery.
179. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co. of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955)
(upholding a state statute prohibiting opticians from fitting old lenses into new frames without a
prescription).
180. The Ninth Circuit in TSPC IV indicated that "a regulation's 'economic effect upon
the claimant' may be measured in several different ways." TSPC IV, 216 F.3d at 772 (citing
Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 714 (1987) (looking to the market value of the property); Key-
stone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 493-96 (1987) (looking to whether
the regulation makes the property owner's business operation "commercially impracticable");
Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979) (looking to the possibility of other economic uses besides
sale, which was prohibited by the challenged regulation)).
181. Given the regionalization requirements, a processor who purchased equipment prior
to the implementation of an IPQ program and wished to subsequently sell his equipment might
be able to make a large profit on the sale.
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Since it is unlikely that a court would find that the IPQ program
and a processor's subsequent exclusion from the fishery would consti-
tute a taking under the first two prongs of the Penn Central test, it is
doubtful that a court's consideration of the "character of the govern-
ment action" would sway the court in the processor's favor. In de-
scribing the third "prong" of the test, the Court in Penn Central ex-
plained: "A 'taking' may more readily be found when the interference
with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by govern-
ment . . . than when interference arises from some public program ad-
justing the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the
common good."1"2 Essentially, it seems as if the "character of the gov-
ernment action" is not so much a prong in its own right, but an indi-
cation that courts are more likely to find a taking when there is physi-
cal invasion of property than when a regulation has the effect of
prohibiting a property owner from making certain uses of his private
property.
2. Limitations for Fishermen
As mentioned above, under NPFMC's three-pie voluntary coop-
erative program, ninety percent of a harvester's allocation will be as
Class A shares. PQS/IPQs are issued for ninety percent of the total
allowable catch (TAC). This means that if a processor has committed
all of its IPQs, harvesters must deliver their catch elsewhere. Thus,
harvesters will be encouraged to find a processor-partner early in the
game. If a harvester waits awhile before "marrying" his Class A
shares with a processor's PQS, he will find fewer processors available
and runs the risk of not getting as good a price for his catch." 3 In such
a situation, the harvester might argue that the requirement that he sell
to specific processors constitutes a taking because of the diminution in
value of his catch occasioned by the government action (the IPQ pro-
gram).
If we apply the Penn Central balancing test, it unlikely that a
court would consider the economic impact of the regulation (the three-
pie voluntary cooperative program) to be a taking. Although the har-
vester who waits to "marry" his Class A shares with a processor's PQS
might receive less for his catch than if he had married his Class A
shares to a different processor earlier on, it is unlikely that the har-
vester's economic loss would be so great as to create a credible takings
claim. The harvester would be assured a fair market price for his
catch because of the binding arbitration process for failed price nego-
182. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
183. This is less of a problem if the harvester joins a cooperative.
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tiations. 184 Furthermore, the fact that there are no delivery restrictions
on Class B shares, allowing the harvester to sell ten percent of his
catch to any processor at the best price possible, reduces the likelihood
that the IPQ system would run the risk of a taking.
It is also unlikely that a harvester's claim would succeed under
the second prong of the Penn Central test. In assessing the harvester's
"investment-backed expectation," a court would probably look at both
the harvester's expectation in entering the fishery (or the harvester's
expectation in being given an individual fishing quota (IFQ)) and the
harvester's expectation at the start of the specific season in question.
Gauging the harvester's investment-backed expectation upon entering
the fishery or in being given an IFQ would be difficult because the
TAC changes from season to season, as does the demand and price of
crabs. Gauging the harvester's investment-backed expectation at the
start of the season might make it a bit easier, given that the TAC had
been set. Under either analysis, a court would still find that the pres-
ence of the binding arbitration process would guarantee a range of
prices that would foreclose a taking claim.
C. Antitrust Concerns
As previously described, NPFMC's three-pie voluntary coopera-
tive program would allocate certain quotas to individual crab harvest-
ers (QS/IFQs) who would be directed to deliver a large portion of
those quotas to processors also subject to quotas (PQS/IPQs). On the
surface, it might appear that NPFMC's proposal "would result in vio-
lations of the federal antitrust laws .... "185 More specifically, it might
appear that IPQs could "become so concentrated as to reach monop-
oly" levels and that such concentration could facilitate price fixing and
184. See Part IV.C.1 supra.
185. Memorandum from Janie E. Rubin, Legislative Attorney, American Law Division,
Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, to the Honorable Patty Murray 1 (July 16,
2002) (on file with author).
The Congressional Research Service (CRS) is a legislative branch within the Library of Con-
gress that provides research, analysis, and information to Members of Congress, their Commit-
tees, and staff on a nonpartisan basis. For more information on CRS, see
http://lcweb.loc.gov/crsinfo/whatscrs.html#about (last visited January 8, 2003).
Although CRS correctly concludes that federal antitrust laws should not pose a problem to the
implementation of NPFMC's three-pie voluntary cooperative program, its reasoning is incorrect.
CRS mistakenly analyzes NPFMC's three-pie voluntary cooperative program as a "state action"
situation-it treats NPFMC as a state regulatory agency and assesses whether NPFMC's pro-
posal violates federal antitrust laws based on the degree of "active supervision" that the Council
would exercise over the private activity. Such an analysis is unnecessary with a federal agency.
See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION
AND ITS PRACTICE 705 (2d ed. 1999).
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other illegal restraints on competition. 8 6  Congress has the power,
however, to expressly exempt conduct from antitrust attack. For ex-
ample, "federal statutes regulating railroads and trucking permit firms
to engage in joint rate-making without running afoul of the antitrust
policy against collusion." '187 Thus Congress could expressly sanction
an exemption from the antitrust laws in the Magnuson Act reauthori-
zation. An express exemption from antitrust laws, however, may not
be politically feasible. 188 One could surmise that harvesters are too
concerned about the power that processing shares could create for an
exemption to be politically acceptable.
A more likely possibility is that an exemption for NPFMC's
three-pie voluntary cooperative program will be implied. Since
"[m]ost regulatory statutes say nothing at all about the impact of the
regulatory regime on antitrust jurisdiction ... any limitation on or ex-
emption from antitrust must be considered as implied rather than ex-
press. ' 89 However, "the domain of such exemptions is narrow ....
Repeals of the antitrust laws by implication from a regulatory statute
are strongly disfavored, and have only been found in cases of plain re-
pugnancy between the antitrust and regulatory provisions. '"19' Despite
the fact that implied exemptions are rare,19' there is a good chance that
a court would find an implied exemption for NPFMC's three-pie vol-
untary cooperative program if it were challenged as violative of federal
antitrust laws. Indeed, the whole purpose of the quota system is to
consolidate the market in order to reduce the adverse effects on the
crab fisheries. Furthermore, the cooperative element of the program
and the binding arbitration provisions, both of which encourage fixed
prices, are intended to make the market more efficient. Therefore, al-
186. William J. Milliken, Individual Transferable Fishing Quotas and Antitrust Law, 1
OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 35, 45 (1994).
187. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 702 (2d ed. 1999) (quoting Motor Carrier Act of 1980, 49
U.S.C. § 10706(b) ("A carrier that is a party to an agreement of at least two rail carriers.., that
relates to rates ... shall apply to the Commission for approval of that agreement.... If the
Commission approves.., the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, the Federal Trade Commission
Act... do not apply.., with respect to making or carrying out the agreement") amended by the
Staggers Rail Act of 1980, 49 U.S.C. § 10706(a)(2)(A) (2000)).
188. Email Correspondence from Mark Fina, Senior Economist, North Pacific Fishery
Management Council, to Avi Brisman (Nov. 24, 2002, 14:22:34 ADT) (on file with author).
189. HOVENKAMP, supra note 187, at 703.
190. Id. (quoting United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350-51 (1963)
(internal quotation omitted)).
191. See, e.g., Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, 422 U.S. 659 (1975) (holding that
antitrust scrutiny over alleged fixing of brokerage commissions would collide with the New York
Stock Exchange's authority to set the rules governing how brokerage rates should be set).
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though NPFMC's proposal, by its very nature, is repugnant to anti-
trust law, it should withstand any attacks on these grounds.
19 2
D. Binding Arbitration
As mentioned in the previous section, since a binding arbitration
mechanism has the effect of a regulatory system to set prices, it would
normally need a Congressional exemption from antitrust laws. For
the reasons described above, however, it is likely that this exemption
could be implied, even if there is no express exemption. Putting aside
antitrust concerns, "[w]ithout congressional action, it is doubtful that
the Council has authority to require binding arbitration in an
FMP. ,,193
Congressional action would essentially entail an amendment to
the Magnuson Stevens Act to include authority for Councils to impose
arbitration agreements on industry (or at a minimum, the authority for
NPFMC to impose this specific binding arbitration agreement on the
crab fishing industry).'94 However, "Congress may only need a simple
provision indicating that Councils may include such [binding arbitra-
tion] agreements as discretionary provisions in FMP's [sic]."' 95 Nev-
ertheless, Congress would still be advised to include "language that
would restrict use of such agreements to a particular purpose so that
Councils do not abuse their power to impose them." '
In amending the Magnuson Stevens Act to authorize Councils to
implement binding arbitration agreements, Congress would also have
to consider the constitutionality of the provision under the Commerce
Clause. "While Congress has extensive power under the Commerce
Clause to regulate, such power is not unrestricted, and any use of it to
influence markets must have a sufficient, supporting reason. Congress
192. Even if one were to try to fit NPFMC's three-pie voluntary cooperative program into
the existing antitrust box, it is unlikely that all of its provisions would violate antitrust law. For
example, NPFMC has placed a thirty percent cap on the percentage of processor shares that can
be owned by one company. See REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 6, at 15. Processors would
not be able to exceed this thirty percent cap through leasing arrangements. CRAB
RATIONALIZATION MOTION OCTOBER 2002, supra note 100, at 3. In the absence of an ex-
emption, either express or implied, it is unlikely that a court would find the figure of thirty per-
cent problematic. See Sea Watch Int'l v. Mosbacher, 762 F. Supp. 370, 380 (D.D.C. 1991)
(finding that ownership of more than forty percent of the shares of IFQs did not constitute own-
ership of "excessive shares"). NPFMC's sixty percent regional cap in the Bering Sea C. opilio
(snow crab) fishery and complete lack of regional caps in the other fisheries, on the other hand,
would be more problematic in the absence of either an express or implied exemption.
193. BERING SEA CRAB RATIONALIZATION PROGRAM ALTERNATIVES, supra note 6, at
35.
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will need a strong rationale for authorization of this type of regulation
to override its intrusion on business, free markets, and freedom of
contract." '197 Compounding the Commerce Clause problem is the fact
that because the proposed rationalization program is novel, there is no
estimate regarding the frequency of breakdowns in price negotiations
between harvesters and processors.'98 "Congress and the Council
could have difficulty specifying the problem that binding arbitration is
intended to address and whether binding arbitration is likely to suc-
cessfully address that problem. "199
Assuming that Congress would provide authorization for bind-
ing arbitration agreements, there is still the question of how the Coun-
cil should implement the agreement. For example, if the terms and
language of the binding arbitration agreement are incorporated into a
regulation to effectuate the proposal, the regulation would have to be
promulgated under the relatively time-consuming process of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, which would require lengthy notice and
comment periods."'
Finally, any binding arbitration agreement would need to pro-
vide for "continual review for consistency with changes in arbitration
law.""'' As the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
General Counsel elaborated:
Parties to the agreement may also wish to incorporate changes
over time. Agreements of this type typically have termination
dates .... [B]ecause of the changing nature of contracts and the
need for review by the Council, NMFS, and the parties, it would
appear that an oversight board composed of representatives of
the parties to the agreement (and possibly NFMS and Council
representatives) could be needed. It if is an advisory board, it
may trigger the FACA [Federal Advisory Committee Act] and
require public notice of meetings and other strictures about
composition and duties.20 2
To summarize, while some binding arbitration mechanism seems
necessary to resolve price disputes, the hurdles in bringing about such
a mechanism seem formidable. Not only would a binding arbitration
mechanism require a Congressional amendment to the Magnuson Ste-
197. Id. Note, however, that Congress's rationale for granting Councils with the authority




200. Id. at 349, 350.
201. Id. at 349.
202. Id. at 349-50.
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vens Act (which in and of itself requires careful consideration of the
constitutionality and scope of the provision), but it would also require
potentially lengthy and complicated administrative procedures regard-
ing the implementation and review of any arbitration agreement.
E. Regionalization
As previously discussed, the Council has included a regionaliza-
tion program as part of its preferred alternative for rationalization,
which would divide the Bering Sea/Aleutian Islands (BSAI) into two
regions and require harvests made with an IFQ and crab processed
under an IPQ to be delivered to a processor in its designated re-
gions.2"' Such a program would not completely constrain the geo-
graphic movement of harvesters and processors, because there are only
two, fairly large regions, and both harvesters and processors have un-
inhibited geographic freedom within the two regions." 4 It is unlikely
that the regionalization program's "limited restraint" would run the
risk of violating the Port Preference Clause of the United States Con-
stitution, which provides:
No Preference shall be given by a Regulation of Commerce or
Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of another: nor shall
Vessels bound to, or from, one State, be obliged to enter, clear,
or pay Duties in another.
205
First, "the clause applies in cases where government regulations
are intended to benefit one state's ports over another state's ports.
' 21 6
Although the regionalization program would constitute a government
regulation benefiting some ports over others, these ports in question
are all within the same state. Second, "government actions will not vio-
late the clause even when they result in a detriment to a port where the
detriment occurs incidental to a legitimate government act regulating
commerce or as a result of accident of geography." 27 Since there is lit-
tle question that the government may regulate the commercial fishing
industry, it seems unlikely that a challenge to the regionalization pro-
203. Id. at 323.
204. Any further constraints on the geographic movement of harvesters and processors
would run the risk of overly restricting the consolidation of activities. This, in turn, would
threaten any gains in efficiency that the rationalization program hopes to achieve. Thus, the re-
gionalization program, which the Council has proposed, is one of "limited restraint on consolida-
tion ... intended to balance community interests against the need for consolidation and effi-
ciency .... " REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 6, at 18.
205. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 6.
206. BERING SEA CRAB RATIONALIZATION PROGRAM ALTERNATIVES, supra note 6, at
207. Id.
20031
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gram based on a violation of the Port Preference Clause would suc-
ceed.
It appears that NPFMC's three-pie voluntary cooperative pro-
gram would withstand attacks based on violations of equally protec-
tion, takings claims, violations of antitrust laws, or violations of the
Port Preference Clause. The only potential hitch could be the binding
arbitration provision. Assuming that Congress does amend the
Magnuson Stevens Act to grant authority for regional Councils to im-
pose arbitration agreements on industry, the question then becomes
whether the benefits of NPFMC's preferred alternative outweigh the
costs.
VI. BENEFITS AND COSTS OF CRAB RATIONALIZATION
Although it appears that North Pacific Fishery Management
Council's (NPFMC) three-pie voluntary cooperative program should
withstand any legal challenges, it does not necessarily mean that the
program as a whole is a good idea. This Comment has discussed some
of the problems with the License Limitation Program (LLP), namely
how the short seasons raise safety and economic concerns, and has al-
luded to how the three-pie voluntary cooperative program would be an
improvement over the current management system.
This Part examines and expands upon four related benefits and
costs that could be derived from rationalization as identified by
NPFMC in its document, Bering Sea Crab Rationalization Program
Alternatives: Public Review Draft (May 2002): (1) benefits derived by
producers, including both harvesters and processors; (2) benefits de-
rived by consumers (particularly U.S. consumers) of Bering
Sea/Aleutian Islands (BSAI) crabs; (3) costs of monitoring and
managing the fisheries; and (4) environmental effects-the combined
effects of responses of producers, consumers, and management to ra-
tionalization on the environment.0 8
A. Benefits to Producers
"Both production sectors [harvesters and processors] are likely to
realize efficiencies and increases in net benefits as a result of rationali-
zation."209
208. Id. at 395. NPFMC emphasizes that "[tihe effects of rationalization cannot be quan-
tified. Quantitative estimation of the effects of rationalization on producers (in both the harvest
and processing sectors) requires complete knowledge of the impacts of rationalization." Id. Pre-
dicting the impacts of rationalization on these fisheries is difficult for a number of reasons, in-
cluding the fact that a two-pie IFQ program is unprecedented and that crab stocks are highly
volatile. Id. at 295.
209. Id. at 397.
[Vol. 26:929
A Less Tragic Commons
1. Benefits to Harvesters
Under the current system-the LLP-harvesters who wish to
increase their revenues must find a way to increase their harvest
rates.21° Often this requires the harvester to invest his money in new
technologies which promise to increase the amount of crabs caught in
a shorter period of time. In this system, harvesters will continue to
invest money in new technologies until the cost of the technologies ex-
ceeds the amount of revenues derived from those investments.
Whereas a competitive fishery, such as the current LLP management,
rewards the use of technologies that increase harvest rates, in a ration-
alized fishery, "harvesters are likely to shift emphasis from inputs [in-
vestments] that increase harvest rates to inputs that reduce harvest
costs. ' '212 Since harvesters will be given an annual allocation in the
form of an individual fishing quota (IFQ), harvesters will have less of
an incentive to invest in new technologies to increase harvest rates,
thereby reducing their harvest costs.
In addition to reducing harvest costs, rationalization could im-
prove efficiency as well. First, by reducing the incentive to increase
harvest rates, rationalization encourages harvesters to take better care
of their equipment. Under the LLP, many pots are lost each year, as
harvesters calculate that it is financially better to drop a new pot or
move on to "known" pots than to spend time looking for lost pots. In
a rationalized fishery, where time is less of a factor, harvesters are
likely to fish with greater care, allowing them to maximize the use of
their pots. 213 Second, with less of an incentive to catch as much as
they can, harvesters will be able to reduce their crew sizes, thereby
also decreasing their harvest costs.2 14
A rationalized fishery should also enable harvesters to improve
their product quality. "Clean shell crab" usually brings a higher price
in the market than "dirty" or "brown shell crab.9211 Without the time
constraints of a competitive fishery, harvesters in a rationalized fishery
who "retrieve pots with relatively high quantities of dirty shell crab
are likely to move to other areas in search of higher value catch."
216
Finally, a rationalized fishery should reduce the problem of
deadloss. Under the current program, the short fishing seasons result
in delivery delays, where harvesters queue up and sometimes have to
210. Id. at 396.
211. See id.
212. Id.
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wait as long as thirty-six hours to offload their crabs.217 Since crabs
must be processed live, harvesters lose money when their crabs die in
the tanks on board (deadloss).2 18 "Reducing the amount of time crab
spend in a vessel's tanks should decrease the number of crab that die
during the wait to offload.- 219  Since deadloss would be counted
against the IFQ holders allocation, any reduction in deadloss would
subsequently increase the net benefits for harvesters.22°
2. Benefits to Processors
Just as rationalization is likely to affect the type of investments
that harvesters make, processors are also expected to shift from mak-
ing investments intended to allow them to process crab quickly to in-
vestments that increase efficiency in processing.221 The extent of these
changes is difficult to predict, however. Crab processing is labor in-
tensive, which means that processors do not invest money in new
technologies at the same rate as harvesters.222 Thus rationalization's
reduced time pressures, which will allow harvesters to invest less
money in technologies that increase harvest rates, will not have the
same effect on processors. In addition, since having crews on hand to
process crab can be costly, processors will have to coordinate the em-
ployment of crews with the delivery of crabs from harvesters. Failure
to do so could result in a less efficient use of crews than under the cur-
rent LLP 3
According to the National Research Council's study, Sharing the
Fish: Toward a National Policy on Individual Fishing Quotas, the ar-
gument for allocating processing quota to processors derives from "a
desire to compensate those who will have to leave the industry because
of excess processing capacity. ' 224 Currently, the processing industry is
"structured to handle large amount of [crabs] ... in short periods of
time. '' 2  Since rationalization would change this dynamic, many
processors would be left with excess processing capital.
As the Alaska Marine Conservation Council explains:




221. See id. at 397.
222. Id.
223. Id. It is almost inevitable that, at first, rationalization will result in higher transaction
costs than the LLP as harvesters and processors figure out the best means for coordinating deliv-
eries among shareholders. Id.
224. SHARING THE FISH, supra note 19, at 153.
225. Id.
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Over the last two decades, processors competed with each other
to build more efficient shoreside plants or buy mobile floating
plants in order to handle massive volume typical of the open ac-
cess race for fish. Slowing down the fishery means that fish will
be delivered at a steadier pace and some processing technology
may become stranded capital.226
Essentially, the inclusion of processor quotas in NPFMC's three-
pie voluntary cooperative program helps ensure that processors will
not be economically disadvantaged and perhaps bankrupted by the in-
ability to control the timing of product flow through their plants.
227
In addition, processors will benefit from a reduction in competi-
tion in the industry. As NPFMC explains: "[r]egionalization is likely
to limit competition in the processing sector. Regionalization will re-
duce the market of processors to which a harvester can deliver crab
harvested with shares that are subject to the regional designation.
221
Finally, processors are also likely to benefit in the development
of new products. Since processors will not have the pressure of proc-
essing a lot of crab in a short period of time, they will have the free-
dom to create new crab products. Combined with the increases in
product quality from the harvesting of "clean shell crab," the demand
for crab could increase, resulting in greater net benefits for proces-
sors.
229
B. Benefits to Consumers
Under the LLP, "both harvesters and processors are subject to
time constraints that limit their ability to focus efforts on improving
product quality and recovery. '"230 Since rationalization will remove the
time pressures that arise in a competitive fishery, harvesters will be
able to improve product quality by harvesting more "clean shell crab"
and processors, as mentioned above, will be able to "develop new
products, increasing the variety of crab products in the market." '231 In
addition, since rationalization is likely to improve crab stocks over the
long term, consumers are likely to benefit from additional product in
the market.232 Finally, since rationalization will mean an end to sea-
sons of only a few days, consumers will likely be able to obtain fresh
226. AMCC LIMITED ACCESS, supra note 17.
227. SHARING THE FISH, supra note 19, at 1 55.
228. BERING SEA CRAB RATIONALIZATION PROGRAM ALTERNATIVES, supra note 6, at
405.
229. Id. at 397.
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crab throughout more of the year (except for the molting and mating
periods). This could also cause the price of crab to decrease.
C. Costs of Monitoring and Management
In order for NPFMC's three-pie voluntary cooperative program
to be successful, and for the aforementioned benefits to be realized, ef-
fective monitoring measures are necessary. According to NPFMC,
however, "[m]onitoring requirements and costs are likely to increase
in a rationalized fishery." '233 The main reason for the increase is that
rationalization will increase the length of the fishing seasons, thereby
increasing the duration of port samplers and observers.234 In compari-
son, "[i]n the current competitive fishery, fishers are on the ground for
a limited time reducing the period during which managers must moni-
tor fishing. Monitoring costs are minimized by the abbreviated, in-
tense seasons. ,
2 3 5
In addition to the increased monitoring periods, costs will also
increase because of the nature of the monitoring required under ra-
tionalization. Under the current management practices, which include
the use of guideline harvest levels (GHL), "harvests are monitored in
the aggregate by collecting harvest information from a sample of par-
ticipants during the season. "236 NPFMC calculates that "[t]his aggre-
gate method of monitoring harvests [will be] significantly less costly
than monitoring the harvests and activities of each vessel (cooperative
or processor) during a protracted season.' '2  Although cooperative
management could reduce the number of allocations that require
monitoring, NPFMC contends that these allocations would still likely
be more costly than monitoring the aggregate harvests in the current
fisheries. 238 Thus, on the whole, rationalization appears to be a more
costly management system than the current competitive fishery.
D. Environmental Effects
As mentioned earlier in this section, the current system of man-
agement is inadequate if the crab fisheries are to be maintained and
restored. Rationalization should result in improved fishing practices
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courage harvesters to fish with greater care, reducing the number of
pots that are lost each year.240 "Reducing the number of pots lost each
year would help reduce crab mortality caused by 'ghost fishing,
' 2 1
(i.e., the "[i]ncidental capture of fish caused by gear that is lost or
abandoned at sea"). 242 Furthermore, because a rationalized fishery
would involve the use of the total allowable catch (TAC), which is
more precise than GHLs, the risk of overharvests would decrease
("because the catch of each vessel [would be] strictly limited by share
holdings.").
243
Unfortunately, one of the downsides to rationalization is the po-
tential for high grading, which is a "[florm of selective sorting of fish
in which higher value, more marketable fish are retained and fish that
could be legally retained, but are less marketable, are discarded." '244
As mentioned earlier, longer fishing seasons and guaranteed quotas
will enable harvesters to replace the less marketable "dirty" or "brown
shell crab" with the more marketable "clean shell crab.""24 If harvest-
ers attempt to increase the quality of their catch through high grading,
the benefits derived from rationalization would be greatly reduced.
The extent to which harvesters will attempt to increase the quality of
their catch and thereby increase discard mortality depends on the ex-
tent to which harvesters perceive a future cost to high grading.246 If
harvesters fail to realize that wasteful fishing practices reduces future
allowable catch and that their individual harvest practices will have a
substantial effect on future crab stocks, they may try to maximize their
current income at the expense of future stocks.247
VII.CONCLUSION
This Comment has attempted to outline the current management
system of the crab fisheries in the Bering Sea/Aleutian Islands (BSAI)
region and the need for crab rationalization as a result of this system.
In addition, this Comment has endeavored to provide an overview of
North Pacific Fishery Management Council's (NPFMC) preferred al-
ternative for rationalization-the three-pie voluntary cooperative pro-
240. See Part VI.A.1, supra.
241. BERING SEA CRAB RATIONALIZATION PROGRAM ALTERNATIVES, supra note 6, at
399.
242. SHARING THE FISH, supra note 19, at 272.
243. BERING SEA CRAB RATIONALIZATION PROGRAM ALTERNATIVES, supra note 6, at
399-400.
244. SHARING THE FISH, supra note 19, at 272.
245. See Part VIA.1, supra.
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gram-to address the legality of such a program, and to assess its po-
tential benefits and costs. While the legal issues concerning the three-
pie voluntary cooperative program appear straightforward, and it
seems clear the program would survive legal challenges, weighing the
benefits and costs of the proposal is more difficult.
It is obvious that in a two-pie individual fishing quota (IFQ)
framework (i.e., one that includes individual processing quotas (IPQ)),
as opposed to a harvester-only IFQ program, harvesters are likely to
fare worse as the market power shifts from the harvest sector to the
processing sector.248 However, the IPQ program, combined with the
regionalization program, helps ensure that Alaskan communities with
a traditional dependence on the crab industry are not economically
disadvantaged.
To illustrate this point, consider that in a harvester-only IFQ
program, harvesters would be able to shop around for the best price.
Thus, a shore-based plant in St. George, for example, would be left
with fewer crabs to process if the harvester can get a better deal in Ko-
diak. If not enough harvesters sell to the St. George plant, then the
plant might go out of business and the town "would feel the pinch
from declines in raw fish tax." '249 Local businesses would also suffer.250
By guaranteeing processors a quota share and by requiring that
processors accept delivery and process crab in designated regions,
NPFMC ensures the economic stability of coastal fishing communi-
ties. If NPFMC does implement the three-pie voluntary cooperative
program, however, and if the program appears to be nothing more
than a means of addressing losses to processors caused by non-
malleable capital, the hope is that the Council would do as it suggested
and phase out the allocation of processing shares.2"'
On the environmental side, any IFQ-based system will likely be
an improvement over the current License Limitation Program (LLP),
especially with regard to ghost fishing. The risk of high grading, how-
ever, is genuine. One way to reduce this risk would be to base initial
allocations not just on catch history, but on demonstrable records of
conservation-minded fishing practices-an idea promoted by the Ma-
rine Fish Conservation Network." 2 This would ensure that the fish-
ery would be composed of harvesters with an eye towards the future -
248. Id. at 404.
249. AMCC LIMITED ACCESS, supra note 17.
250. See id.
251. BERING SEA CRAB RATIONALIZATION PROGRAM ALTERNATIVES, supra note 6, at
404.
252. SEA CHANGE, supra note 34, at 3.
[Vol. 26:929
A Less Tragic Commons
individuals who would respect the commons and not try to maximize
their current income at the expense of future stocks." 3
NPFMC should revise its three-pie voluntary cooperative pro-
gram to directly address the problems of high grading before proceed-
ing with rationalization. Regardless of the ultimate form of crab ra-
tionalization, it is important for NPFMC to recognize that in order to
ensure the long-term sustainability of the crab fisheries, the specific
rationalization program should not be considered a final step, but part
of an on-going process. Just as the LLP "was intended to serve as an
interim step toward a more comprehensive solution to the conserva-
tion, management, and economic problems in an open access fish-
ery,' ' 254 any system of rationalization should be regarded as part of a
larger work in progress.
253. One could imagine that discard limits and observer coverage would also help reduce
the chances of high grading.
254. BERING SEA CRAB RATIONALIZATION PROGRAM ALTERNATIVES, supra note 6, at
2003]
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Appendix A
ACRONYM LIST
ADF&G Alaska Department of Fish and Game
BSAI Bering Sea/Aleutian Islands
CRS Congressional Research Service
EQP Endorsement Qualification Period
FMP Fishery Management Plan
GHL Guideline Harvest Level
GQP General Qualification Period
IFQ Individual Fishing Quota
IPQ Individual Processing Quota
ITQ Individual Transferable Quota
LLP License Limitation Program
NMFS National Marine Fisheries Service
NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration
NPFMC North Pacific Fishery Management Council
PQS Processing Quota Shares
QS Quota Share
RPP Recent Participation Period
TAC Total Allowable Catch
VMP Vessel Moratorium Program
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